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ABSTRACT: 
This research aims to find the appropriate level of transparency in different buyer-supplier 
relationships in order to enhance value co-creation in the supply network. The previous 
literature demonstrates that transparency brings many benefits but also causes risks. 
Therefore, transparency needs to be balanced in different buyer-supplier relationships. 
 
This research was an embedded single case study containing three supplier groups within 
the supply network. The primary and qualitative research data related to the antecedents for 
transparency and the effects of transparency on value co-creation was collected from 14 in-
depth semi-structured interviews. This data was analyzed by a causal map analysis. The 
secondary research data had been collected from the web-based structured questionnaires 
from the customer and its 24 suppliers. This data was analyzed by a descriptive statistics in 
order to describe the current level of transparency in the supply network. 
 
The research results indicated that the level of transparency in the supply network varied 
based on the type of the relationship where the more collaborative relationships had the 
higher level of transparency and the more powerful actor seemed to force the other to share 
information. Furthermore, transparency was believed to require trust but also the arranged 
methods and IT-systems for information sharing which need allocated resources and causes 
costs. The results also indicated that transparency had many value-creating effects related 
to capabilities, integration, operational performance and financial outcomes but it also had 
some value-destroying effects. Lastly, a framework was created in order to determine the 
development suggestions for the appropriate level of transparency in different buyer-
supplier relationships in the supply network so that more value can be created and shared 
between the actors. The framework is applicable at least with the similar supply networks 
which provide low volume manufactured products with many different and variable items. 
 
KEYWORDS: Supply chain collaboration, supply chain visibility, buyer-supplier 
relationships, relationship transparency, value co-creation.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ: 
Tämä tutkimus pyrkii löytämään asianmukaisen avoimuuden tason erilaisissa ostaja-
toimittajasuhteissa, jotta arvon yhteisluontia voidaan edistää toimitusverkostossa. 
Aikaisempi kirjallisuus esittää, että avoimuus tuo monia etuja, mutta siitä seuraa myös 
riskejä. Näin ollen avoimuuden tulee olla tasapainossa erilaisissa ostaja-toimittajasuhteissa.  
 
Tämä tutkimus oli sisäkkäinen yksittäinen tapaustutkimus sisältäen kolme toimittaja-
ryhmää toimitusverkoston sisällä. Ensisijainen ja laadullinen tutkimusaineisto avoimuuden 
edeltäjistä ja avoimuuden arvon yhteisluonnin vaikutuksista hankittiin 14:stä puolittain 
jäsennellystä syvähaastattelusta. Tämä aineisto analysoitiin kausaalisella kartta-analyysillä. 
Toissijainen ja määrällinen tutkimusaineisto oli kerätty verkkopohjaisista strukturoiduista 
kyselyistä asiakkaalta ja sen 24:ltä toimittajalta. Tätä aineistoa analysoitiin kuvailevalla 
tilastoanalyysillä toimitusverkoston avoimuuden nykytason kuvailemiseksi. 
 
Tutkimustulokset osoittivat, että avoimuuden taso toimitusverkossa vaihteli suhteen tyypin 
mukaan, jolloin yhteistyötyyppisillä suhteilla oli korkeampi avoimuuden taso ja vahvempi 
osapuoli näytti pakottavan toista jakamaan tietoa. Lisäksi avoimuuden uskottiin vaativan 
luottamusta, mutta myös sovittuja menetelmiä ja tietotekniikkajärjestelmiä, jotka tarvitsevat 
allokoituja resursseja ja aiheuttavat kustannuksia. Tulokset myös osoittivat, että 
avoimuudella oli monia arvoa luovia vaikutuksia, jotka liittyivät kyvykkyyksiin, 
integraatioon, operatiiviseen suorituskykyyn ja taloudellisiin tuloksiin, mutta sillä oli myös 
joitain arvoa tuhoavia vaikutuksia. Lopuksi muodostettiin viitekehys kehitysehdotusten 
määrittämiseksi avoimuuden asianmukaiselle tasolle erilaisissa toimitusverkoston ostaja-
toimittajasuhteissa, jotta arvoa voidaan jakaa ja luoda lisää osapuolten välillä. Viitekehys 
soveltuu ainakin samanlaisiin toimitusverkostoihin, jotka tarjoavat pienellä volyymillä 
valmistettuja tuotteita useilla erilaisilla ja vaihtelevilla nimikkeillä. 
 
AVAINSANAT: Toimitusketjuyhteistyö, toimitusketjun läpinäkyvyys, ostaja-
toimittajasuhteet, suhteen avoimuus, arvon yhteisluonti.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This section introduces the background and scope of the thesis including the research 
problem, questions and objectives. Furthermore, the structure of the thesis is presented. 
1.1 Background 
During the past decades, companies have increased collaboration in order to have an 
efficient and responsive supply chain for the changing market needs (Cao and Zhang 2011: 
166). Supply chain collaboration can create benefits when the actors in the supply chain 
jointly create the mutual way to share information and synchronize supply in order to lower 
inventories, avoid bullwhip effect, improve business synergy and quality as well as create 
flexibility and joint innovations in the supply chain (Cao and Zhang 2011: 174). However, 
there is a widespread belief that the most of the companies have not used the whole 
potential of collaboration and therefore there is a need to understand its practical value and 
the specific characteristics of close relationships (Min, Roath, Daugherty, Genchev, Chen, 
Arndtet & Richey 2005: 238; Goffin Lemke & Szwejczewskiet 2006: 190). 
 
Zacharia, Nix and Lusch (2011: 597) argue that when companies share information, 
exchange knowledge and generate ideas these lead to the great operational outcomes. 
According to Barratt and Oke (2007: 1230), information sharing leads to visibility which 
improves the operational performance of a supply chain. In the buyer-supplier 
relationships, the two-way information and knowledge sharing can be seen as a relationship 
transparency which Eggert and Helm (2003: 103, 106–107) define as:  
”an individual’s subjective perception of being informed about the relevant actions 
and properties of the other party.”  
 
They argue that transparency have an effect on the success of a buyer-supplier relationship 
as it increases customer’s value and satisfaction as well as leads to positive behavioral 
intentions. Respectively, Lamming, Caldwell and Harrison (2004: 293–294, 2006: 208) 
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introduce the idea of value transparency where both parties should gain value in the 
relationship from exchanging sensitive information and knowledge. They describe that 
relationship transparency relate to the exchange of cost, technological, operational and 
strategic information. 
1.2 Scope  
Eggert and Helm (2003: 106–107.) argue that transparency brings many benefits but too 
much transparency can increase uncertainty if the actor does not know how to use new 
information. Furthermore, too much irrelevant information to the receiver can cause a 
negative impact on satisfaction. Similarly, Lamming, Caldwell, Phillips and Harrison 
(2005: 558–561) present that transparency can cause risks for both parties such as 
information leakages to the supplier’s competitors whereas the supplier can provide false 
information or use the shared information from customer’s processes opportunistically. 
Furthermore, Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 629–634) argue that even though transparency 
can solve problems related to the material flow, product development and search for the 
supplier, increased transparency can cause other type of problems. For example, suppliers' 
products can become commoditized or actors' power positions can change too much. 
Therefore, transparency causes risks and it has to be balanced in different buyer-supplier 
relationships. In addition, relationship transparency has received quite little research 
interest (Eggert and Helm 2003: 101, Hultman and Axelsson 2007: 628). Therefore, the 
main objective of this research is to make the development suggestions for the appropriate 
level of transparency in different buyer-supplier relationships in the supply network, so that 
more value can be created and shared between the actors. Based on the main objective, the 
research problem is defined as follows:  
What is the appropriate level of transparency in different buyer-supplier relationships 
in order to enhance value co-creation in the supply network? 
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This research applies Hultman and Axelsson’s (2007: 629–630) typology of transparency 
and especially its four types of transparency (cost, supply, technological and 
organizational). Furthermore, the strategic transparency concerning information about 
parties’ business strategy and competitive advantage is added as the fifth transparency type 
because it can improve relationship value in terms of performance improvements (Klein & 
Rai 2009: 750). These types are related to the first research question which is defined 
below. The aim is to describe the current levels of five different transparency types in 
different buyer-supplier relationships in the supply network. 
 
RQ1 What is the level of transparency in the supply network? 
 
In order to make development suggestions for the appropriate level of transparency in 
different buyer-supplier relationships, it is important to know which things in the 
relationship have the effects on the level of transparency. Therefore, the second research 
question aims to find the antecedents for transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships by 
identifying the causal beliefs about how the actors understand the requirements for 
transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships. 
 
RQ2 What are the antecedents for transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships? 
 
It is also important to understand the concept of value thoroughly in order to find the value-
creating effects of transparency and to propose the appropriate level of transparency in 
different buyer-supplier relationships. According to Corsaro (2014), value in the 
relationships has been conceptualized as the factors which provide value in the relationship. 
This has mainly related to the search for the situation where the benefits exceed the 
sacrifices leading to relationship value. For example, the relationship value can be 
categorized into integration-based, supplier capability-based and operational performance-
based value factors which together form the financial outcomes (Terpend, Tyler, Krause & 
Handfield 2008: 40). There is also a growing viewpoint where value is understood as 
“value in use”. Based on that viewpoint, the suppliers cannot create value included in the 
products and services but they can co-create value during interaction with the customer 
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(Vargo and Lusch 2008: 7). Value co-creation during interaction means that the supplier 
works together with the customer and directly impacts on the customer’s processes 
(Grönroos 2011b: 243–245). However, the value co-creation viewpoint needs further 
research at the Business-To-Business (B2B) context (Grönroos 2011b: 246). This leads to 
the third research question defined below. 
 
RQ3 How can transparency have effects on value co-creation in the buyer-supplier 
relationships? 
 
Based on the above mentioned viewpoints of value, the effects of transparency on value co-
creation are analyzed by identifying the causal beliefs of how the actors understand the 
value-creating effects of transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships. Value co-creation 
is understood as a collaborative process to create value between the actors during 
interaction. 
 
In summary, the research is a descripto-explanatory research where description is a 
precursor to the explanation (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012: 171). At first, the level of 
transparency in the supply network (RQ1) is described. This leads to the explanatory phase 
where the antecedents for transparency (RQ2) as well as the causal beliefs related to 
transparency and value (RQ3) are studied. Table 1 below summarizes the research problem 
and questions related to the research objectives. 
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Table 1. Research problem, questions and objectives. 
 
 
The research strategy of this thesis is a case study containing the lead company and its 24 
most important suppliers. The lead company is an industrial machinery manufacturer 
located in Finland. The lead company’s 24 most important suppliers form 84 % of its 
annual purchasing volume. These suppliers are grouped into three different supplier groups 
which also represent the embedded cases within this single case study: contract 
manufacturers, technology suppliers and subcontractors. Contract manufacturers refer to 
the nine system suppliers who provide components and/or sub-assemblies with a 
collaborative long-term relationship. These various sized suppliers are mainly located in 
Finland. Technology suppliers refer to the eight suppliers who provide high-tech 
components and are usually big global companies with their own products. This group also 
includes technical wholesalers providing various community components. Subcontractors 
refer to the seven small-sized suppliers who provide machined metal components and are 
mainly located in Finland. In this research, the customer refers to the buyer in the buyer-
Research problem: Main objective of the research:
What is the appropriate level of 
transparency in different buyer-supplier 
relationships in order to enhance value 
co-creation in the supply network?
To make development suggestions for the 
appropriate level of transparency in different 
buyer-supplier relationships in the supply 
network so that more value can be created and 
shared between the actors.
Research questions: Research objectives:
RQ1 What is the level of transparency 
in the supply network?
To describe the current levels of different 
transparency types in different buyer-supplier 
relationships in the supply network.
RQ2 What are the antecedents for 
transparency in the buyer-supplier 
relationships?
To identify the causal beliefs about how the 
actors understand the requirements for 
transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships.
RQ3 How can transparency have 
effects on value co-creation in the 
buyer-supplier relationships?
To identify the causal beliefs about how the 
actors understand the value-creating effects of 
transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships.
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supplier relationships. Furthermore, the lead company, the customer and the buyer refer to 
the same company. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured by theoretical and empirical parts that support each other. Chapter 
2 contains the theoretical background of this study. At first, Chapter 2.1 introduces the 
previous empirical studies on supply chain collaboration. This is followed by Chapter 2.2 
where interaction and relationship integration are introduced. After that, Chapter 2.3 
introduces relationship transparency and its different types along with the related concepts. 
Then Chapter 2.4 introduces different viewpoints for the value in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Lastly, Chapter 2.5 synthesizes these theories along with the framework for 
the empirical part. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the research methods and the research strategy for the empirical part of 
this thesis. It also introduces the data collection techniques and the data analysis procedures 
as well as how these are related to the research questions. Chapter 4 contains the empirical 
research results by following the order of the research questions. At first, Chapter 4.1 
introduces the findings about the current level of transparency in the supply network. Then, 
Chapter 4.2 introduces the findings about the antecedents for transparency. Lastly, Chapter 
4.3 introduces the findings about the value-creating effects of transparency. 
 
Chapter 5 contains discussion and development suggestions. At first, Chapter 5.1 interprets 
the results presented in the previous result chapter and follows the order of the research 
questions as well. After that, Chapter 5.2 introduces the development suggestions for the 
appropriate level of transparency in the supply network. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the 
whole research as well as introduces the limitations and the implications for further 
research.  
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
At first, this theoretical chapter presents previous empirical studies on supply chain 
collaboration. This is followed by the interaction and integration of buyer-supplier 
relationships. After that, relationship transparency and its different types along with the 
related concepts are introduced thoroughly. Then the value in the buyer-supplier 
relationships and the related concepts are introduced. Lastly, this theoretical part is 
synthesized along with the framework for the empirical part. The academic articles on these 
topics were searched from scientific databases (e.g. EBSCO, Emerald, Sage and Science 
Direct) and the reference lists in the suitable articles. 
2.1 Supply chain collaboration 
Cox (2004a: 347–348) explains that some authors argue that the most beneficial style to 
manage supplier relationships is always transparent and long-term “win-win” collaboration 
based on the Japanese “lean” approach and sometimes more “agile and responsive” 
approach. However, other authors criticize that this kind of long-term and collaborative 
approach requires customer dominance over the suppliers. Moreover, the creations of trust 
and win-win outcomes are not always realized. Cox’s (2004a: 349–355) study indicates that 
it is difficult for customers or suppliers to reach their relationship goals due to insufficient 
capability and competence or weak power position. For example, there are only a few 
companies who are able to have enough resources and/or dominance over its suppliers to 
have collaborative and resource intensive relationships with the most of its suppliers. 
Therefore, there is a need to find an appropriate way to manage supplier relationships in a 
given situation. This can happen through aligning sourcing strategy (e.g. reactive short-term 
or proactive long-term at the first-tier or at multiple tiers), specific power situation (e.g. 
dependency and dominance) and appropriate relationship management style (e.g. arm’s 
length or collaboration). 
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Min et al. (2006: 245) and Cao and Zhang (2011: 166) argue that supply chain 
collaboration (SCC) has many definitions and usually these are related to two groups of 
conceptualization: process and relationship focus. Process focus refers to the business 
processes where the actors are planning and executing supply chain operations with better 
outcomes than when working individually (e.g. Simatupang & Sridharan 2002: 19). 
Respectively, relationship focus refers to the linkages between the firms or long-term 
partnerships where the actors are sharing resources, information, and risks in order to reach 
mutual objectives (e.g. Golicic, Foggin & Mentzer 2003: 64–65). Cao and Zhang (2011: 
166) combine these two viewpoints and define supply chain collaboration as:  
”a partnership process where two or more autonomous firms work closely to plan and 
execute supply chain operations toward common goals and mutual benefits.” 
 
Cao and Chang (2011: 163) argue that sometimes the term supply chain integration (SCI) is 
used as SCC to determine a collaborative process between the actors in a supply chain. 
However, SCI concentrates more on ownership, centralized control and process integration 
whereas SCC have more relational approach related to governance. Flynn, Huo and Zhao 
(2010: 59) define SCI as:  
”the degree to which a manufacturer strategically collaborates with its supply chain 
partners and collaboratively manages intra- and inter-organization processes.”  
 
Moreover, the target of SCI is to provide maximum value for the customer through 
improved efficiency and effectiveness in the movements of products, money, information 
and decisions. They argue that SCI can be understood through three dimensions: internal-, 
customer-, and supplier integration. Internal integration refers to the manufacturer’s own 
activities related to meeting its customer’s requirements and enhancing interaction with its 
suppliers. Customer and supplier integrations refer to the external integration where the 
actors’ practices, processes and strategies are structured into synchronized and 
collaborative processes. Table 2 below introduces the previous empirical studies related to 
supply chain collaboration with its activities and antecedents as well as benefits and the 
sacrifices. 
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Table 2. Empirical studies on supply chain collaboration. 
 
 
According to empirical study by Min et al. (2006: 248), collaboration happens through 
sharing information, solving problems, planning together, measuring performance and 
leveraging. Information sharing contains forecasting, scheduling, market planning and 
production capacity planning. Problem solving includes logistics, marketing support, 
quality control, development / redesign products and cost-benefit analysis whereas mutual 
planning refers to joint goals and objectives. Performance measurement includes regular 
performance reviews, key performance indicator measurements, reward decisions and 
corrective actions. Lastly, leveraging includes capacity, resources, skills, specialization and 
knowledge. Similarly, Nyaga, Whipple and Lynch (2010: 103–104, 109) describe that the 
Author 
& year
Research methods & 
data
Activities Antecedents Benefits Sacrifices (costs, risks)
Min et 
al. 
(2006)
Survey (N=62) and 
interviews of logistics 
and supply chain 
managers in the US; 
qualitative; coding
Information sharing, 
problem solving, mutual 
planning, performance 
measurement and 
leveraging
Internal alignments, 
strategic intent, free 
flow of information, 
relationship orientation, 
relationship-specific 
investments, and 
communication as well 
as formalization
Improved efficiency and 
effectiveness, 
profitability, and 
reinforcement and 
expansion of the 
relationship
N/A
Das et 
al. 
(2006)
Survey of 
manufacturing 
companies in various 
industries in the US 
(N=322); quantitative; 
factor analysis
Supplier integration: 
syncronizing the 
external and internal 
practices
Six specific beneficial 
practices
Improved manufacturing 
performance which 
leads to improved 
financial performance
Supplier integration 
might cause the 
increased cost of 
coordination and 
inflexibilities so that 
there is a need to find 
an optimal level of 
collaborative efforts in 
supplier relationships
Nyaga 
et al. 
(2010)
Survey for buyers and 
suppliers in various 
manufacturing and 
service industries in
the US (N=625); 
quantitative; structural 
equation modeling
Information sharing, 
joint relationship effort 
and relationship-
specific investments
Commitment and trust
Satisfactions with the 
relationship and results. 
Improved performance.
Suppliers commitment 
to a relationship with a 
buyer may not 
guarantee increased
business or improved 
performance
Cao 
and 
Zhang 
(2011)
Survey of 
manufacturing 
companies in various 
industries in the US 
(N=211); quantitative; 
factor analysis and 
structural equation
modeling
Information sharing, 
goal congruence, 
decision 
synchronization, 
incentive alignment, 
resource sharing, 
collaborative 
communication and 
joint knowledge 
creation
Parties investments in 
collaboration and 
creation of the mutual 
way of information 
sharing, 
replenishment, and 
supply 
synchronization.
Increased collaborative 
advantage and improved 
financial performance
N/A
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activities of collaboration relate to information sharing, mutual relationship effort and 
relationship-specific investments. Information sharing includes the relevant information 
about changes and other information that can help the other party. Joint relationship effort 
refers to joint planning and problem solving whereas relationship-specific investments 
include dedicated personnel, expertise, technology, equipment and support systems.  
 
Cao and Zhang’s (2011: 174) study demonstrate that collaboration happens when 
information is shared, decisions are synchronized, goals are set, incentives are aligned, 
collaborative communication is a norm, resources are shared and knowledge is created 
mutually. Information sharing includes all the needed and beneficial information that is 
shared between the actors. Decision synchronization means partners’ joint decisions that 
optimize the benefits of the supply chain. Goal setting refers to actors’ agreement about the 
supply chain goals related to their own goals. Incentive alignment relates to shared benefits, 
costs, and risks between the actors. Resource sharing refers to leverage and investment in 
capabilities and assets with the actors whereas collaborative communication refers to 
frequent, open, two-way and informal communication through different channels between 
the parties. Lastly, joint knowledge creation includes the joint creation of new and relevant 
knowledge related to customer needs, markets and competitive environment. 
 
There are many antecedents for supply chain collaboration. For example, Min et al. (2006: 
245) find that collaboration requires strategic intent (e.g. functional integration based on 
capabilities), internal alignments (e.g. process mapping and integrating internal operations), 
relationship orientation (e.g. long-term orientation), relationship-specific investments (e.g. 
tangible and intangible resources, training, information technology and time), the open 
information and communication flow as well as formalization (e.g. targets, performance 
measures, rules and procedures). Das et al. (2006: 574) find six practices of supplier 
integration which relate to the high performance of the company: joint problem solving, 
direct communication between the production schedulers, the usage of buyer-supplier 
councils, development and certification of suppliers by purchasing department as well as 
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joint goal setting between manufacturing and purchasing. Nyaga et al. (2010: 109) describe 
that collaborative relationships require trust and commitments. Lastly, Cao and Zhang 
(2011: 174) argue that collaboration requires that the parties in the supply chain invest in 
collaboration and create the mutual way of sharing information, making replenishment, and 
synchronizing supply.  
 
Min et al. (2006: 250) reveal that supply chain collaboration improves efficiency (reduced 
costs, inventory, and lead-time), effectiveness (increased market share, improved customer 
service and pricing, and new product development), profitability (higher Return on 
Investment (ROI) and sales) and the relationship (commitment, trust and joint 
involvements). Respectively, Cao and Zhang (2011: 175–177) find that supply chain 
collaboration increases collaborative advantage (efficient processes, flexible offering, 
business synergy, new innovations and better quality) which lead to improved performance 
(sales growth, growth in ROI and better profit margin on sales). Furthermore, they argue 
that collaborative advantage helps to build up synergies and improve performance between 
the supply chain actors. 
 
Das, Narasimhan and Talluri (2006: 572–573, 576–579) find that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between performance and supplier integration. Therefore, it is beneficial to 
invest in supplier integration but there is a need to have an appropriate level of 
collaboration because supplier integration can increase the coordination costs and cause 
inflexibilities. They argue that supplier integration with appropriate practices can improve 
manufacturing performance (reduced costs, the quality of conformance and shorter lead 
times) which leads to improved financial performance (improved profit, and market and 
sales growth). Nyaga et al. (2010: 109–110) reveal that collaborative relationships can 
results in improved satisfactions with the relationship and results as well as better 
operational performance if the trust and commitment are at high level. However, they find 
that commitment does not have significant positive effects on performance for suppliers. 
They argue that this result indicates that in the collaborative relationships where suppliers’ 
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have strong commitment to the relationship may not be guaranteed supplier’s increased 
business or improved performance because the customer may still require periodic contract 
renegotiations or rebidding which may not be beneficial to a supplier.  
2.2 Interaction and relationship integration 
Gadde and Snehota (2000: 315) argue that supplier relationships should be viewed and 
treated similarly than the investments of the company because these relationships are the 
most important asset for a firm. The full potential from the suppliers can be capitalized by 
closely integrating the operations between the companies. This kind of relationship 
integration requires the coordination of the activities, the adaptations of the resources and 
interactions between the people, which all cause costs for both firms. However, heavy 
involvement is not always appropriate because of supplier’s lack of necessary motivation 
and interest, realized higher costs than benefits or company’s limited resources. This 
viewpoint is in line with Cox’s (2004a) findings which indicate the need to find the most 
beneficial approach to manage a supplier relationship in a given situation. 
 
Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group’s researchers argue that interaction is the 
main process in business that happens between firms. It also has effects on the resources 
and activities of the firms (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, Snehota & Waluszewski 2010: 86–
88). The process and outcomes of interaction can be understood through activity links, 
resource ties and actor bonds as Håkansson & Snehota (1995: 28–34) describe. The Actors-
Resources-Activities (ARA) framework suggests that these three things are connected as 
well as each of those closely relates to the wider actor network, resource combinations and 
activity patterns. 
 
Similarly with the IMP group’s viewpoints, Vesalainen and Kohtamäki (2015: 108) have 
conceptualized relationship integration and have suggested that typically integration can be 
understood through three dimensions: relational capital (the relational form of social 
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capital), relationship structures, and relationship-specific investments. These can be also 
understood through structural, economic and social dimensions related to the broader 
relational governance theory. Moreover, one or more dimensions can be present at the same 
time. Furthermore, these three dimensions of integration refer to the depth of the 
relationship whereas interaction occurs within the relationship. Respectively, Kim, Choi 
and Skilton (2015: 321) have conceptualized buyer-supplier embeddedness (integration) to 
structural and relational dimensions by using the social embeddedness literature. In their 
conceptualization, relational dimension refers to relational capital whereas structural 
dimension contains both relationship structures and relationship-specific investments. 
2.2.1 Interaction in buyer-supplier relationships 
Ford and Mouzas (2013: 435) explain that the IMP group view interaction within the 
relationships as a process where each actor tries to solve its own problems. Interaction can 
contain learning, teaching, coercion and concession by the actors at the specific time and 
for the specific issues. It also requires trade-offs between actors’ benefits and costs for the 
specific time period. Ford et al. (2010: 88) conceptualize interaction as: 
”the substantive process that occurs between business actors through which all of the 
aspects of business: material, financial and human and all of the elements of business: 
actors, activities and resources take their form, are changed and are transformed.” 
 
The substantive process means that interaction is not only limited only to negotiation or 
communication. It also relates to the actors’ resources and activities and determines these 
factors’ usefulness, form, and value. That kind of interaction aims to satisfy the needs of the 
actor or actors. Moreover, interaction may lead to the transformation or adaptation of the 
actors, resources and activities in order to satisfy the specific needs of the actor. These 
adaptations and transformations also relate to the interactions in the future as they cause the 
complex interdependencies between the actors. (Ford & Mouzas 2013: 435–436) 
 
IMP group’s researchers argue that interaction cannot be controlled by any actor directly or 
indirectly involved or affected by it because interaction is substantive (Ford and Håkansson 
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2013: 1019; Ford & Mouzas 2013: 436–437). However, many actors can influence its 
direction. This substantive effect can be understood through the structure of relatedness at 
the specific time and the process of interaction over time related to activities, resources and 
actors. At a specific point in time, relatedness can be understood through the 
interdependencies between the activities of the actors (e.g. integrated production or 
logistics systems), the heterogeneity of resources (the adaptation and development of 
companies’ resources) and the jointness of the actors (e.g. product development 
collaboration). The interaction process over time can be understood through: the 
specialization of activities resulted by the evolving interdependencies between specific 
activities, the path of resource development and the co-evolution of the actors as they 
interact with each other (e.g. the adjustment of their ways of thinking). 
 
Grönroos (2011b: 243–245) describes that interaction is a process where the other actor has 
ability to have an influence on another. He argues that customer-supplier interaction in a 
business context refers to the contact with two or more actors where they have abilities to 
impact on each other’s processes. Interactions as a manufacturing viewpoint (including 
manufacturing processes as well as order taking, complaints handling, etc.) means that co-
producing opportunities exist for the customer when the customer can influence the 
supplier’s manufacturing process. Interaction from a value creation (or value-in-use) 
perspective means that the supplier has ability to influence the customer's processes in a 
way that supports customer's value creation. Therefore, value can be co-created during 
interaction. In practice, interaction and value co-creation can take place during 
manufacturing, development, design, deliveries and service-processes. Moreover, the 
supplier can only facilitate the customer’s value creation without the interaction. However, 
the existence of interaction is only a starting point for the supplier to directly influence 
customers' value creation. Therefore, the quality of the interactions between the parties is 
crucial for value co-creation (i.e. how effectively the parties can use the interaction to 
enhance customer’s value creation).  
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2.2.2 Relationship structures 
Activity links (or relationship structures) in the ARA framework refers to the integration 
and coordination of activities between the actors (Håkansson & Snehota 1995: 28–29). For 
example, during relationship development, the activities (e.g. information sharing, 
production, deliveries, logistics, and administration) can be closely integrated with the 
partner company. Furthermore, the modification and readjustment may be needed when the 
activities of the partner companies change over time. When companies’ activities become 
linked and coordinated, a complex activity pattern can emerge where different companies 
have different parts to handle. Therefore, the changes somewhere in the activity pattern 
have effects on the activity links between two companies. 
 
Kohtamäki, Vesalainen, Henneberg, Naudé and Ventresca (2012: 1300–1301) present that 
relationship structures include the IT systems and organizational routines that enhance 
interaction in the buyer-supplier relationships. They define it through four dimensions: 
integrated relationship IT systems, relationship steering group, development teams and 
relationship process descriptions. For example, integrated relationship IT systems (e.g. Just 
in Time (JIT) -systems, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) -systems, Computer-aided 
Design (CAD) -programs or social media) are needed to help interaction between the 
companies. Furthermore, relationship steering group is needed to manage the development 
tasks in the relationship whereas development teams are needed for implementing the 
development tasks. Lastly, relationship process descriptions (e.g. routines for order-
delivery) direct interactions between the parties. 
 
Kim et al. (2015: 321) present that when the structural dimension of the relationship relates 
to efficient exchange patterns at the multiple levels along with the high frequency of 
interaction and routine based responses to events. They also state that relationship-specific 
investments have established because they include relationship-specific investments within 
the structural dimension. Similarly like these previous viewpoints, Grönroos (2011b: 244) 
argue that interaction requires a platform for interaction where the interaction between the 
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customer and the supplier can occur. The interactive platform can be created through 
interactive systems where different collaborative activities can happen (e.g. product and 
service development collaboration). Lastly, Kohtamäki et al. (2012: 1306) find that 
relational structures do not have direct effect on relationship performance improvement. 
However, it can create the platform for interactions between firms and with the relational 
capital it can help to improve relationship performance. 
2.2.3 Relationship-specific investments 
Resource ties (or relationship-specific investments) in the ARA framework refers to 
adapted and more or less mutually tied tangible (e.g. plants and equipment) and intangible 
resources (e.g. commercial, technical and administrative knowledge) which make up the 
activities (Håkansson & Snehota 1995: 30–32). These resource ties are results from the 
relationship development and can lead to more efficient resource usage. Moreover, the new 
combinations of resources can occur when the relationship develops further. However, 
developing a relationship by increasing resource integrations is often costly and the benefits 
occur usually in the future. Furthermore, the developed relationship becomes an asset that 
need to be taken care of and utilized efficiently. Therefore, relationship development can be 
seen as an investment process. In addition, resource ties in a relationship are an element of 
the aggregated structure that forms a larger resource combination. This resource 
combination can become a valuable asset as well as a constraint for the competitors. 
 
According to Kohtamäki et al. (2012: 1301–1306) relationship-specific investments relate 
to the resources that are dedicated to the specific relationship. These are also difficult to 
utilize in other relationships. For example, the investments can be related to the 
relationship-specific manufacturing competencies, information systems or equipment and 
tools. They reveal that relationship-specific investments have direct effects on the 
relationship performance resulting in the improvements of quality, delivery accuracy, 
productivity and capital usage. 
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According to Laaksonen, Pajunen and Kulmala (2008: 911, 916–917), relationship-specific 
investments tie both parties in the buyer-supplier relationship together because these 
investments’ value is much smaller in the other relationships and the current customer or 
supplier has capability to produce the items more cost efficiently than alternative suppliers 
which have not made these investments. Moreover, relationship-specific investments 
reduce the number of possible suppliers or customers and lead to reduced bargaining power 
for the other party. They have found out from their case study that relationship-specific 
investments improve customer’s trust to the suppliers in terms of supplier’s competence 
and goodwill. This leads to the commitment and long-term contracts as well as enhances 
information sharing in the relationship. Lastly, these arrangements improve the resources in 
the relationship which lead to the more competitive customer-supplier relationship. 
Respectively, the case study by Grönroos and Helle (2010: 581–584) indicate that when the 
supplier and the customer make relationship-specific investments in order to integrate both 
parties’ resources, processes and competencies in new ways, they were able to create more 
value and share it for both parties by using a transparent pricing mechanism. 
2.2.4 Relational capital 
The actor bonds (or relational capital) in the ARA framework refers to the interpersonal 
bonds that are developed between the people of partner companies during interaction 
(Håkansson & Snehota 1995: 32–34). The actor bonds have effects on the actors' present 
and future interaction in the relationships. Moreover, the wider web of actors in the network 
can change when the individual actors learn and adjust their actor bonds. 
 
Kohtamäki et al. (2012: 1300), argue that relational capital can be understood as a social 
capital that occurs within the buyer-supplier relationships and is related to trust, community 
and open interaction. Similarly, Kim et al. (2015: 321) demonstrate that relational 
dimension indicates partnership orientation when trust is at high level, information is 
shared freely, and relational norms and shared values help to control and solve conflicts. 
Furthermore, parties’ intention is to reach a lasting commitment.  
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Laaksonen et al. (2008: 911) define trust in a buyer-supplier relationship as: 
”a belief by one party in a relationship that the other party will not act against his or 
her interests, where this belief is held without undue doubt or suspicion and in the 
absence of detailed information about the actions of the other party.” 
 
Laaksonen et al. (2008: 911, 915) also distinguish trust to three different types: contractual, 
competence and goodwill. Contractual trust means that the other party will behave based on 
the oral or written agreements. Competence trust relates to the other party’s ability to 
perform based on the agreement. Lastly, goodwill trust refers to the other party’s intentions 
to perform based on the agreement. They argue that these types of trust closely relate to 
each other and usually these develop dynamically within the relationship. However, they 
find that contractual trust is not needed in a close buyer-supplier relationship. Day, Fawcett 
S., Fawcett A. and Magnan (2013: 153–154) argue that trust enhances the creation of 
relational capital and defines it as a function of benevolence and credibility. They argue 
that trust can be seen as: 
”confidence that each party in a relationship will perform as promised and genuinely 
take each other's welfare into consideration as each makes decisions.”  
 
Huang and Wilkinson (2013: 459–463) point out the dynamical aspects of trust and argue 
that trust always changes based on the actions and interactions which occur over time. 
 
Kohtamäki et al. (2012: 1306) demonstrate that relational capital have direct effects on 
relationship performance improvement (delivery accuracy, product quality, productivity 
and capital usage) which can be explained as the relational capital’s ability to increase 
knowledge creation and sharing. Moreover, relational capital is required for the relationship 
structures so that these can have positive effects on relationship performance. For example, 
relationship structures provide the platform for interactions between companies whereas 
relational capital improves interaction, knowledge sharing and creation between the parties 
which then lead to improved relationship performance. 
 
The high level of relational capital can also bring some negative effects such as customer’s 
reduced objectivity and decision making capability as well as supplier’s increased 
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opportunistic behavior as Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011: 570–573) have found out. Their 
survey results indicate that there is a curvilinear relationship between performance and 
social capital. They argue that customers can create social capital so that they can leverage 
resources in the buyer-supplier relationships and improve operational performance (reduced 
total costs and lead time as well as improved flexibility, product quality and processes) and 
strategic performance (new products, markets, and technological areas, and extended 
product range). However, too high level of social capital can take away those benefits 
where operational performance starts to decrease at first followed by strategic performance 
a bit later. These finding are also supported by the case studies by Day et al. (2013: 160–
161). They argue that trust development can create benefits such as transactional efficiency 
and collaborative innovation as well as responsive and harmonious relationships. However, 
it also includes different risks such as the opportunism in the relationship, resource 
misallocation, reduced objectivity, and negative dependency. 
2.3 Relationship transparency 
Cox (2004a: 349–353) argue that when a buyer-supplier relationship moves from a low 
involvement arm’s length market relationship towards a high involvement collaborative 
relationship, the parties began to provide the more transparent cost and operational 
information in order to reduce costs and / or improve the functionality of a product or 
service offering. It is usually impossible to provide that kind of offering in arm’s length 
relationships. Eggert and Helm (2003: 103), defines transparency in the relationships as:  
”an individual’s subjective perception of being informed about the relevant actions 
and properties of the other party.” 
  
Lamming et al. (2004: 293–294, 2006: 208) introduce the idea of value transparency where 
both parties should capture relationship value from exchanging sensitive information and 
knowledge. They present that the transparency in the relationship refers to the exchange of 
various valuable things related to costs, technologies, operations and strategic issues. 
Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 629–630) extend the concept of relationship transparency 
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and divide it into four different types of transparency. The first type, cost and price 
transparency means that the information on costs and prices and their flows become 
transparent between the parties. The second type, supply transparency refers to the 
transparent information on the flows of products and materials between the parties. The 
third type, organizational transparency, concerns the information about other company’s 
organization so that the parties know who to contact with and how the other organization 
processes work. The fourth type, technological transparency concerns the shared 
information about product data and technologies as well as product development. Table 3 
below introduces the previous studies related to the relationship transparency as a whole. 
 
Table 3. Empirical studies on relationship transparency. 
 
 
Lamming, Caldwell, Harrison and Phillips (2001: 6.) argue that transparency in 
relationships requires joint sharing or pooling of risk, two way exchange of information and 
Author & 
year
Research methods & 
data
Transparency 
types
Antecedents Benefits Sacrifices (costs, risks)
Eggert & 
Helm 
(2003)
Survey of purchasing 
managers in Germany 
(N=342); quantitative; 
structural equation 
modeling
Cost 
(economic 
situation), 
Technological 
(technical 
abilities), 
Organizational 
(organizational 
structure)
Shared information 
needs to be relevant 
and available with 
right amount. The 
level of transparency 
needs to be optimized 
within the given 
competitive context 
rather than 
maximized.
Create value to the 
customer (increase 
customer's perceived value 
in terms of quality vs. price 
and net-value), increase 
customer satisfaction, 
repurchase intentions, word-
of-mouth intentions and 
reduce search for 
alternative suppliers.
Too high level of  
transparency can 
increase uncertainty if the 
actor does not know how 
to use the new 
information. Too much 
information (especially 
irrelevant for the receiver) 
can have negative impact 
on satisfaction.
Lamming 
et al. 
(2001), 
(2004), 
(2006)
Theoretical study and 
action research of 
four high technology 
manufacturing
companies in the UK; 
qualitative; iterative 
process of data 
collection, analysis, 
reflection and 
synthesis
Cost, 
Technological, 
Supply 
(operational), 
Strategic
Transparency 
requires joint sharing 
or pooling of risk, two 
way exhange of 
information and trust.
Help the creation of valuable 
outputs which the final 
customer may be expected 
to buy and eliminate waste 
(non-value adding 
activities).
Risk for the supplier that 
the critical information 
may leak to the supplier’s 
competitors. Suppliers' 
sales turnover and profits 
can be lower. Risk for the 
customer that the supplier 
give false information or 
supplier act 
opportunistically.
Hultman 
& 
Axelsson 
(2007)
Case studies of two 
manufacturing 
companies in 
Sweden; qualitative; 
labeling
Cost, Supply, 
Organizational, 
Technological
Transparency 
requires trust and 
information 
technology. The level 
of transparency 
needs to be balanced 
in the relationships.
Help to solve problems of 
efficiency in flows of 
materials, product 
development and supplier 
search.
Transparency can 
produce problems such 
as suppliers' products can 
become commoditized or 
actors' power positions 
can change too much.
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trust. Eggert and Helm (2003: 103.) argue that the shared information needs to be relevant 
and available at right amount. Therefore, the level of transparency needs to be optimized 
within the given competitive context rather than maximized. Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 
633–634.) argue that transparency requires trust and information technology. Also they 
argue that the level of transparency needs to be balanced in the relationship in order to 
avoid its risks. Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 634) argue that there can be a strong 
relationship between trust and transparency as well as between information technology and 
transparency which can have effects on the realized outcomes of transparency. 
 
The outcomes of the increased transparency are usually positive but some negative effects 
can occur according to previous empirical studies. For example, Eggert and Helm (2003: 
106–107.) find out from the survey that transparency can create value to the customer 
(increase customer's perceived value in terms of quality vs. price and net-value), reduce the 
search for suppliers, and increase customer satisfaction as well as the word-of-mouth and 
repurchase intentions. However, the results also show that too much transparency can 
increase uncertainty if the actor does not know how to use the new information. 
Furthermore, too much information (especially irrelevant to the receiver) can affect 
negatively on satisfaction. The results also indicate that there are limited effects of 
transparency on customer value and satisfaction. Therefore, transparency alone is not 
sufficient to create customer value and enhance customer satisfaction. They argue that 
product and other relationship factors are still very important issues. Similarly, Lamming et 
al. (2004: 292) suggest that transparency is not appropriate in all supply relationships but it 
can leads to significant success and brings benefits for both parties when it is managed as 
one element of the relationship along with the other relationship elements. 
 
Lamming et al. (2005: 558–561) have found out from their action research that 
transparency helps to create a valuable and attractive offering for the customer as well as 
eliminate waste (non-value adding activities). However, the benefits are usually realized by 
the customer whereas supplier’s benefits are limited to the retention of the business and 
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improvements in efficiency especially if the transparency is only one-way action. 
Transparency can also cause risks for both parties. Risks for the supplier are that the critical 
information may leak to the supplier’s competitors when the customer encourages them to 
reduce costs. Moreover, suppliers' sales turnover and profits can be lower due to reduced 
process costs and thus prices. Risks for the customer are that the supplier gives false 
information (e.g. distort the cost information) or supplier use the knowledge about 
customer's processes opportunistically. Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 633–634) have found 
out from their case studies that increased transparency provide positive effects such as help 
the problem solving related to the efficiency in the flows of materials, supplier search and 
product development. However, transparency also causes negative effects such as suppliers' 
products can become commoditized or actors' power positions can change too much. 
 
Next, the four different types of transparency (cost / price, supply, organizational, 
technological) suggested by Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 629) are presented more detailed 
based on previous empirical findings. In addition to these four types, strategic transparency 
is added as fifth type of transparency. At first, the definition of each transparency type is 
introduced with related theories and concepts. Then, the antecedents for the transparency 
types are introduced. Lastly, the realized benefits and sacrifices (e.g. risks and costs) of the 
transparency type are introduced. 
2.3.1 Cost transparency and open-book accounting 
According to Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 629–630), cost transparency means that the 
cost and price information become transparent between the parties. This type of 
transparency is closely related to open-book accounting (OBA) which relates to cost 
information that is shared between the parties in the relationship (Möller, Windolp & 
Isbruch 2011: 124). Similarly, Caglio and Ditillo (2012: 62) conceptualized open-book 
accounting as the exchange of management accounting information between legally 
independent actors and add that this information would be otherwise kept secret. Table 4 
below introduces previous studies related to cost transparency and open-book accounting. 
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Table 4. Empirical studies on cost transparency and open-book accounting. 
 
 
Kajüter and Kulmala’s (2005: 200) case studies demonstrate that the benefits from OBA 
require technical factors such as the appropriate cost accounting systems and support for 
Author & 
year
Research methods & 
data
Transparency 
types
Antecedents Benefits
Sacrifices (costs, 
risks)
Kajuter & 
Kulmala 
(2005)
Case studies of 
German car 
manufacturing network 
and three Finnish 
manufacturing 
networks; qualitative; 
cross-case analysis
Cost
Cost accounting systems 
and support for the data 
collection or 
development. Members’ 
commitment to the 
network, mutual trust, and 
team thinking.
Reduced costs and warrant of trust. 
Usually customers gain more 
benefits than suppliers.
Sharing internal cost 
data involves the risk 
of being misused.
Agndal & 
Nilsson 
(2010)
Case studies of three 
buyer-supplier 
relationship in different 
industries in Sweden; 
qualitative; cross-case 
analysis
Cost N/A
Support cost efficient products and 
manufacturing processes, achieve 
price control, communicate price 
reduction expectations, avoid 
misunderstandings and supplier's 
overcharge, supplier's better ability 
to meet customer’s requirements in 
supplier selection as well as 
becoming more competitive and 
favored supplier with possibility for 
long contracts. It can also reduce 
tension and allow profit sharing from 
increased sales and mutual 
improvements as well as bring 
compensation to fluctuations in raw 
materials and quantities
N/A
Suomala 
et al. 
(2010)
Interventionist 
researches of two 
supply networks one 
manufacturing mining 
equipments and other 
excavators; qualitative; 
creating and refining 
interventions 
Cost
Companies awareness of 
their own costs (e.g. 
activity-based cost 
models). Goals set for the 
OBA process.
Cost reduction, significantly 
improved cost-awareness on
product level (and  consensus on 
that between buyer and supplier), 
better visibility into suppliers' 
processes, reduce risk for relying 
on wrong conclusions or beliefs, 
help to create positive relationship 
through open-book negotiations
Risks of buyer's 
opportunistic behavior 
(e.g. the buyer share 
supplier's 
development ideas to 
suppliers' competitors 
or re-organizing the 
supply chain)
Möller et 
al. (2011)
Survey of 1st and 2nd 
tier automotive 
suppliers in Germany 
(N=147); quantitative; 
structural equation 
modeling
Cost
Commitment (e.g. 
relationship-specific 
investments) but not 
necessarily trust.
N/A N/A
Caglio & 
Ditillo 
(2012)
Survey of a fashion firm 
and its 18 suppliers in 
Italy (N=57); 
quantitative; social 
network analysis
Cost
Information technology 
and the long duration of 
the relationship.
N/A
The risk that the 
quantity of  the 
management 
accounting information 
is too high and costly 
to control certain tasks 
and too low to control 
others.
Alenius 
et al. 
(2015)
Case study of one 
buyer-supplier 
relationship in Swedish 
food grocery sector; 
qualitative; coding
Cost N/A
OBA can enable the use of price 
mechanism more effectively and 
lower costs. Increase revenue by 
guiding managers to prioritize and 
identify the opportunities for sales 
increases.
N/A
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data collection or development. Furthermore, OBA requires actors’ commitment to the 
network, team thinking and trust. Moreover, each participating actor should gain benefits 
from the OBA practices (i.e. reach win-win situation in the relationship). Surprisingly, 
Möller et al. (2011: 126–129) have found out from their survey that supplier’s trust does 
not have a big effect on the implementation of OBA or inter-organizational cost 
management (IOCM). They argue that the relationships between trust and these two factors 
are very complex. Suomala, Lahikainen, Lyly-Yrjänäinen and Paranko (2010: 91–92) 
present that the biggest effect on the outcomes of OBA came from the goals set for the 
implementation process. For example, their case studies show that the powerful customer 
can set mutually beneficial explicit goals for OBA but can also have a silent agenda (e.g. 
re-organizing the supply chain) that can lead to the win-lose outcomes. 
 
According to previous researches, the benefits of OBA are mainly related to cost reductions 
in products and manufacturing processes (Kajüter and Kulmala 2005: 200; Suomala et al. 
2010: 87–88; Agndal and Nilsson’s 2010: 158; Alenius, Lind & Strömsten 2015: 204). 
Furthermore, the studies of Suomala et al. (2010: 90–93) indicate that OBA can 
significantly improve cost-awareness on product level as well as bring consensus on that 
between the customer and the supplier. Other realized benefits relate to better visibility into 
suppliers' processes, reduce risk of relying on wrong conclusions or beliefs and help to 
create a positive relationship through open-book negotiations. Moreover, the case studies of 
Agndal and Nilsson (2010: 158–159) show that OBA can help customers to achieve price 
control and communicate price reduction expectations as well as help to avoid 
misunderstandings and supplier's overcharge. It can also help to gain insight into supplier's 
condition and the supply chain as well as support to commoditize complex offerings. 
Potential benefits for the supplier are better ability to meet customer’s requirements in 
supplier selection as well as becoming more competitive and favored supplier with long 
contracts. It can also reduce tension and allow sharing profits from increased sales and 
mutual improvements as well as bring compensation to fluctuations in raw materials and 
quantities. Lastly, Alenius et al. (2015: 204) find that OBA can increase revenue by guiding 
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managers to prioritize and identify the opportunities for sales increases in the relationships. 
Furthermore, OBA can enable the use of price mechanism more effectively when the cost 
element is added in the relationship. 
 
Kajüter and Kulmala’s (2005: 200) case studies indicate that usually customers gain more 
benefits than suppliers. Moreover, sharing internal cost data has the risk of being misused. 
However, OBA can also maintain trust. This is based on the future potential for increased 
volume, but it requires that the customer can guarantee the information is not misused. This 
is also supported by the case studies of Suomala et al. (2010: 88, 91–93) which indicate that 
the powerful customers perceive the OBA process useful and financially rewarding. At the 
same time, some of their suppliers’ realize win-win outcomes but others realize negative 
outcomes when the customer behaves opportunistically (e.g. sharing supplier's development 
ideas to suppliers' competitors and re-organizing the supply chain). The findings indicate 
that the customer’s commitment to long-term collaborative relationship and close personal 
relations may help to avoid these kinds of problems.  
 
Kajüter and Kulmala (2005: 199) argue that open-book accounting is successful only in the 
specific circumstances such as in a hierarchical and long-term supply network that 
manufacture functional products. Caglio and Ditillo (2012: 69–73) argue that without 
considering the specific characteristics of the tasks and the relationships, the risk is that the 
quantity of management accounting information is too high and costly to control certain 
tasks and too low to control others. 
2.3.2 Supply transparency and supply chain visibility 
The second type of the Hultman and Axelsson’s (2007: 630) conceptualization of 
transparency is supply transparency which refers to various materials and products which 
flow between the customer and the supplier. Similar to that term is supply chain visibility 
(SCV) which is a generally used term in logistics and supply chain management disciplines 
(Francis 2008: 181, Barratt and Oke (2007: 1217). It is also one of the most important thing 
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or challenge among supply chain management researchers and practitioners but has not any 
general definition. Barratt and Oke (2007: 1218) make distinction between information 
sharing and visibility by proposing that information sharing is an activity whereas visibility 
is an outcome of this kind of activity. They define supply chain visibility as:  
”the extent to which actors within a supply chain have access to or share information 
which they consider as key or useful to their operations and which they consider will 
be of mutual benefit.”  
 
Francis (2008: 182–183) combines the previous definitions of SCV and tries to give a more 
precise definition for the supply chain visibility concept. He defines it as:  
”Supply chain visibility is the identity, location and status of entities transiting the 
supply chain, captured in timely messages about events, along with the planned and 
actual dates/times for these events.”  
 
An entity in this definition refers to the objects which move through supply chain (e.g. an 
order, a package, a shipment or a vehicle). The identity of the entity is a specific identifier 
(e.g. a bar code, an order number or a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag). Location 
is the position of the entity and can be static or dynamic (e.g. static in a warehouse or 
dynamic in transfer by truck). Status refers to the state of the entity which depends on the 
processes relating the entity (e.g. waiting to be machined). A message refers to 
communication and it contains the information about the entity (e.g. identity, location and 
its status) through various types of communication (e.g. EDI transmission, automatic data 
capture, web information, a phone call). An event refers to the particular time when the 
status and / or the location of the entity changes. Lastly, actual and planned times are the 
specific times when the event occurs or when it is planned to occur. This definition 
indicates that SCV is a requirement for the effective decisions about supply chain 
operations and clearly shows that the information technology is required to be integrated 
with the partners in the supply chain. 
 
Williams, Roh, Tokar & Swink (2013: 548, 548) explain supply chain visibility as:  
”access to high quality information that describes various factors of demand and 
supply.”  
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They describe that the requirements for the high quality information relate to accuracy and 
completeness as well as it must be current and in a form that is usable. Therefore, various 
types of high quality supply chain information are needed. This information contains 
market-level (i.e. supply and demand information) and two-way partner-level information. 
For example, the suppliers gain visibility when it gets information from customer's sales, 
demand, inventory, and promotions. Respectively, the customer gains visibility from 
getting information from the supplier about its order lead times, shipments, inventory 
levels, and the locations of finished goods. Table 5 below introduces previous studies 
related to supply transparency and supply chain visibility related researches. 
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Table 5. Empirical studies on supply transparency and supply chain visibility. 
 
Author 
& year
Research methods & 
data
Transparency types Antecedents Benefits
Sacrifices 
(costs, risks)
Akkerm
ans et 
al. 
(2004)
Case study (action 
research) of one high-
tech electronics supply 
chain in Netherland; 
qualitative; iterative 
process of data 
collection, analysis, 
reflection and synthesis
Supply (order and 
production statuses, 
plans and forecasts)
Self-enforcing dynamic
interactions between  
shared hard working  
(travail),  believe in the 
honesty, integrity,
reliability and  justice of 
the partners (trust)
Increased transparency 
leads to improved 
decision-making quality 
which leads to better 
supply chain 
performance. This
then leads to habituation, 
which, in turn, increases
trust and transparency
If performance 
is low then 
also trust and 
transparency  
remain low 
without the 
hard work by 
all involved 
people
Barratt 
& Oke 
(2007)
Case studies of five 
supply chain 
relationships in the UK 
consumer packaged 
goods sector; 
qualitative; cross-case 
analysis
Supply (demand, 
POS, promotions, 
inventory levels, 
production schedule); 
Technological 
(product development 
plans)
The level of visibility 
depend on the strength 
of a particular linkage, 
time spent in 
developing the 
relationship, informal 
procedures, trust and 
commitment
Visibility leads to an 
improved operational 
performance (reduced 
inventory and quality 
issues, increased product 
availability and flexibility, 
and improved 
responsiveness)
N/A
Zhou & 
Benton 
(2007)
Survey of 
manufacturing 
companies in North 
America (N=125); 
quantitative; structural 
equation modeling
Supply (order 
changes, planned 
orders, inventory level, 
forecasts, production 
plans, production 
capacity, order status, 
delivery schedule and 
changes, lead times); 
Technological 
(product design)
Effective information 
sharing enhances 
supply chain practices 
(e.g. supply chain 
planning, JIT 
production and delivery 
practices) and can 
lead to enhanced 
supply chain 
transparency
Information quality has 
positive effect on delivery 
performance (on-time 
delivery, perfect order 
fulfillment rate, delivery 
reliability)
Too much 
customer 
information 
has negative 
impact on 
delivery 
performance
Barratt 
& 
Barratt 
(2011)
Case study including 
interviews of 48 
informants in UK retail 
grocery sector; 
qualitative; searching 
linkages and identifying 
patterns
Cost (cost drivers); 
Supply (forecasts, 
inventory levels, 
production plans and 
schedules, lead-time, 
promotions); 
Technological 
(product development 
plans, new products)
Visibility requires 
internal information-
based linkages within 
the organization and 
external information-
based linkages 
between the 
organizartions in the 
supply chain
Supply chain visibility can 
improve operational 
performance
William
s et al. 
(2013)
Survey of supply chain 
executives throughout 
the world (N=206); 
quantitative; regression 
analysis
Supply (POS or actual 
sales data, demand 
forecasts, inventory 
levels, and customer 
promotional plans. 
supplier lead 
time/delivery dates, 
adv. shipment notices)
Visibility requires the 
acquisition of multiple 
types of high quality 
information. Increased 
responsiveness 
through SC visibility 
requires high levels of 
internal integration
Visibility improve 
responsiveness if internal 
integration is also at the 
high level.
N/A
Lee et 
al. 
(2014)
Survey of component 
manufacturers in Korea 
(N=124); quantitative; 
structural equation 
modeling
Supply (inventory 
status, order status, 
production schedule, 
current production 
capacity, demand 
forecast information)
Inter-organizational 
systems (IOS) visibility 
require asset 
specificity, 
interorganizational 
trust, complementary 
resources, and joint 
governance structures
IOS visibility improves 
overall supply chain 
performance (cost 
efficiences from higher 
sales volumes, 
improvements to 
processes and  
increased profitability)
N/A
36 
 
Akkermans, Bogerd and Doremalen (2004: 448–449) argue that transparency in a supply 
chain requires dynamical interactions related to mutual hard working (travail), believe in 
the honesty, reliability, integrity and justice (trust). Barratt and Oke’s (2007: 1230.) case 
studies demonstrate that the level of visibility varies based on the strengths of the specific  
connections because these relate to the resource deployment, time allocation to the 
relationship development, informal discussions as well as commitment and trust between 
the partners. Barratt M. and Barratt R.’s (2011: 524–525) case study indicates that visibility 
requires internal information-based connections between organization’s functions as well as 
external information-based connections between the supply chain partners. Lee, Sun Kim 
and Kyu Kim (2014: 290–291) have found out that supply chain visibility through inter-
organizational information systems requires trust, asset specificity, complementary 
resources, and joint governance structures. 
 
The finding from the study of Akkermans et al. (2004: 448–454) indicates that increased 
transparency in a supply chain improves the quality of decision-making that leads to 
improved performance. This then results in habituation which can increase trust and 
transparency leading to better performance. However, when performance is at the low level 
then also trust and transparency stay at the low level especially if the partners are not 
working hard together to start the causal loop that increases transparency, trust and 
performance. Similarly, Barratt and Oke’s (2007: 1230) and Barratt M. and Barratt R.’s 
(2011: 524–525) results reveal that visibility in a supply chain improves operational 
performance (e.g. increased flexibility and product availability, reduced inventories and 
improved quality and responsiveness). 
 
Zhou and Benton (2007: 1361) have studied information sharing in supply chains and have 
found out from their survey that effective information sharing improves JIT-production, 
planning and delivery practices in a supply chain. Moreover, supply chain practices and 
high quality information have direct positive effect on delivery performance in terms of 
delivery accuracy and order fulfillment. However, they also argue that when the customer 
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provides information more frequently it can lead to difficulties for the supplier to meet the 
continuously changing delivery requirements.  
 
Williams et al. (2013: 549–552) present that supply chain visibility improves companies’ 
capabilities to handle the changes in their business environment (i.e. better responsiveness). 
However, this requires that internal integration within the organization is at the high level 
because it helps to reach a mutual understanding about the visible information as well as 
reduces uncertainty. Lee et al. (2014: 290–292) demonstrate that supply chain visibility 
gained by integrated information systems improves the overall supply chain performance in 
terms of cost efficiency, process improvements, new process creation and increased 
profitability. 
2.3.3 Organizational transparency 
The third type of the Hultman and Axelsson’s (2007: 630) conceptualization of 
transparency is organizational transparency which concerns the information of other 
company’s organization so that the parties know who to contact and how the other 
organization’s processes work.  
 
The results of the case studies by Hultman and Axelsson (2007: 631) indicate that high 
level of organizational transparency can also bring problems. Problems occurred when the 
customers’ personnel are given direct contacts with suppliers’ personnel causing the lack of 
information to the key actors. This situation leads to mistakes such as lack of needed 
information for the key-account managers. Previously, all information was shared only 
through key-account managers. The solution to this problem was to get even more 
transparency and to ensure that shared information was located in the same place by using a 
web-based project platform. 
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2.3.4 Technological transparency and supplier involvement in NPD 
The fourth type of the Hultman and Axelsson’s (2007: 630–633) conceptualization of 
transparency is technological transparency which refers to the shared information about 
product data and technologies as well as product development. This type of transparency is 
related to suppliers’ early involvement in customer’s product development and the 
customers’ willingness to move development activities to suppliers. For example, the actors 
in the network can share product data (e.g. CAD-files) and work together by using shared 
software (e.g. extranet) in order to improve the efficiency of the product development. 
 
Supplier involvement in new product development (NPD) has been studied since the 1980s 
and especially in the automotive industry where supplier involvement was believed to be 
the most important thing for the excellent NPD performance of Japanese automotive 
companies (Johnsen 2009: 188). Van Echtelt, Wynstra, van Weele and Duysters (2008: 
182) describe that supplier involvement in NPD has usually been understood as the 
information provided by the suppliers and supplier’s participation in decision making or as 
parties’ integrated capabilities. They provide their own definition as follows:  
”Supplier involvement refers to the resources (capabilities, investments, information, 
knowledge, ideas) that suppliers provide, the tasks they carry out and the 
responsibilities they assume regarding the development of a part, process or service 
for the benefit of a buyer’s current or future product development projects.” 
 
Table 6 below introduces previous studies on technological transparency and supplier 
involvement in NPD. 
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Table 6. Empirical studies on technological transparency and supplier involvement in new 
product development. 
 
 
Walter’s (2003: 728) study indicates that supplier involvement in NPD relates to supplier’s 
commitment and trust. Moreover, the managers who are working as a relationship promoter 
(RP) in the customer’s company have major impact whereas supplier-specific investments 
Author & 
year
Research methods & 
data
Transparency 
types
Antecedents Benefits Sacrifices (costs, risks)
Walter 
(2003)
Standardized
interviews of 267 
German supplier 
companies (N=510); 
quantitative; structural 
equation modeling
Techno-
logical
Supplier commitment and 
trust, relationship 
promoters and supplier-
specific investments
N/A N/A
van 
Echtelt 
et al. 
(2008)
Case studies of 8 
supplier involvement 
cases in one 
manufacturer in the 
printer and copier 
industry; qualitative; 
cross-case analysis
Techno-
logical
Strategic and operational 
management activities
Short-term and long-term 
benefits related to NPD
Concentrating only to 
operational activities can 
lead to failures to 
capture long-term 
learning and technology 
benefits
Jayaram 
(2008)
Survey of US 
manufacturing 
companies (N=338), 
quantitative, factor 
analysis
Techno-
logical
Communication, 
information sharing, design 
involvement
and infrastructure 
development of joint 
programs 
Improved NPD project 
performance (product 
cost, conformance quality, 
design quality and market 
introduction time)
N/A
Johnsen 
(2009)
Literature review on 
supplier involement in 
NPD between 1985-
2008; theoretical; 
critical analysis and 
synthesis of empirical 
studies
Techno-
logical
Supplier selection, supplier 
relationship development 
and adaptation, and 
internal customer 
capabilities
Reduced new product 
introduction time, improved 
product quality, reduced 
development and product 
costs
N/A
Smals & 
Smits 
(2012)
Case studies of 2 
relationships between 
large high-tech OEM 
and medium-sized 
supplier in Netherland; 
qualitative; cross-case 
analysis
Techno-
logical
N/A
Direct value for supplier: 
financial payment for sales 
volume and product 
development services; 
Indirect value for supplier: 
technological knowledge 
and product designs that 
can be used to other 
customers and references
Indirect value may not be 
realized if the supplier 
may not be able to use 
its relationship-specific 
investment for other 
customers when the  
customer reduce its 
involvement in product 
development
Sjoerds
ma & 
van 
Weele 
(2015)
Case studies of 4 
global NPD projects in 
a large multinational 
company; qualitative; 
cross-case analysis
Techno-
logical
Better relationship quality 
resulting better more 
knowledge transfer 
(explicit and tacit)
Reduced new product 
introduction time, 
increased product quality, 
reduced NPD costs
Supplier's poor 
capabilities and different 
culture can delay the 
NPD project and 
increase costs even that 
the relationship quality is 
at high level
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have not as major impact on supplier involvement in NPD. Furthermore, the RPs and 
supplier-specific investments have effects on supplier’s trust and commitment. Similarly, 
Johnsen (2009: 193) describes that previous studies indicate that supplier relationships with 
trust and commitment require excellent supplier selection processes, internal coordination, 
and long-term adaptation of the relationship. 
 
The results from Jayaram’s (2008: 3724) study reveals that supplier involvement in NPD 
requires involvement in design, the development of infrastructure, communication, and 
information sharing related to mutual projects with the suppliers. The case studies of van 
Echtelt et al. (2008: 195–196) indicates that benefits from supplier involvement in NPD 
require strategic and operative management activities. For example, strategic activities are 
needed to provide operational support and a long-term, strategic direction for the project 
teams as well as to develop suppliers who are able to meet the requirements related to 
current and future capabilities and technologies. Respectively, operational activities help to 
plan, manage, and evaluate the collaboration in the different development projects. 
 
Johnsen (2009: 193–194) have synthesized the previous researches on the supplier 
involvement in NPD and divide the success factors into three different groups: internal 
customer capabilities, supplier selection, and supplier relationship development and 
adaptation. Internal customer capabilities relate to the commitment of top management and 
cross-functional coordination. Supplier selection relates to supplier’s early involvement, 
separation between supplier roles and involvement levels, and supplier evaluation / 
selection based on complementarity and innovation capability. Lastly, supplier relationship 
development and adaptation relate to mutual training and commitment, the sharing of risks / 
rewards, the agreements of target performance and measures, and supplier’s representatives 
in the NPD team.  
 
Sjoerdsma and van Weele’s (2015: 199–201) case studies reveal that benefits from the 
supplier involvement in NPD require improved relationship quality resulting in increased 
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knowledge transfer between the actors. They argue that relationship quality includes 
satisfaction, loyalty, reputation, relationship-specific investments, customer’s / supplier’s 
attractiveness, performance, trust, communication, information and knowledge sharing, 
cooperation and coordination, commitment, transparency, flexibility, and capability and 
competence. When these are at high level, the result is increased knowledge transfer 
(explicit and tacit knowledge) between the actors leading to better NPD performance. 
 
Hultman and Axelsson’s (2007: 633) case studies indicate that when technological 
transparency increases it causes concerns about the legal issues and the risk related to the 
flows of sensitive information (e.g. CAD-files or evaluation spreadsheets). The findings 
indicate that the liability problems can be prevented by restricting transparency. For 
example, providing access to certain information for some actors and restricting access for 
others in the extranet. 
 
Johnsen (2009: 193) and Sjoerdsma & van Weele (2015: 193–200) reveal that previous 
researches show that supplier involvement in NPD can improve performance such as 
reduced development and product costs, improved product quality, and shorter product 
introduction time. Similarly, Jayaram’s (2008: 3725–3729) study indicates that supplier 
involvement in NPD can bring improvements in terms of product costs, the quality of 
conformance and design, and new product introduction time. Moreover, the study reveals 
that information sharing and communication (e.g. communicating with the key suppliers 
and sharing design information) can have stronger effects on new product introduction time 
in unstable and dynamic markets rather than stable markets. According to the case studies 
of van Echtelt et al. (2008: 196–197), supplier involvement in NPD provides short-term as 
well as long-term benefits. Short-term benefits refer to the better technical performance of 
products, lower product and product development costs and shorter new product 
introduction time whereas long-term benefits refer to more effective / efficient 
collaboration in the future, the alignment of a technology roadmap, access to supplier's 
technology and the usage of developed solutions for other projects. However, these kinds of 
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long-term benefits may not be received if the managers are concentrating only on 
operational activities and therefore are not able to get the long-term learning and 
technological benefits.  
 
For the supplier’s perspective, Smals and Smits (2012: 160–162) have found out that 
supplier involvement in NPD provides direct and indirect value to the supplier. Direct value 
is realized in terms of financial benefits from sales volumes and product development 
services. Indirect value in the future refers to the reputation of doing business with a high-
end company as well as increased technological knowledge and product designs which can 
bring benefits to other customer relationships. However, indirect value may not be realized 
if the supplier is unable to use its customer-specific investments for other customer 
relationships. In addition, Sjoerdsma and van Weele (2015: 201) case studies reveal that 
supplier's poor capabilities and different organizational cultures can delay the NPD project 
and increase costs even when the relationship quality is at the high level. 
2.3.5 Strategic transparency 
Strategic transparency can be seen as the fifth type of transparency in addition to Hultman 
and Axelsson’s (2007) four transparency types. Frazier, Maltz, Antia and Rindfleisch 
(2009: 32) presents that shared strategic information can be external or internal which both 
have effects on companies’ long-term decision making. External strategic information 
consists of information within the organization about its customers and competitors 
whereas internal strategic information consists of information within the organization about 
its future actions. Table 7 below introduces previous studies related to strategic 
transparency. 
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Table 7. Empirical studies on strategic transparency. 
 
 
According to the empirical results of Frazier et al. (2009: 38–40), sharing strategic 
information between the supplier and the distributor requires dependence asymmetry 
favoring distributor and both parties’ relationship-specific investments. Furthermore, trust 
is required to share internal strategic information and product-market familiarity enhances 
to share external strategic information. Klein and Rai (2009: 749–751) present that sharing 
strategic / competitive information (e.g. competitive positioning and planned actions on 
markets) as well as production-related and financial information in the logistics provider’s 
and its customer relationship requires trust, customer’s dependence on its supplier and 
customer’s IT customization. They argue that when the customer has a high level of 
dependence on its supplier they are more willing to share strategic information, because 
they have a need to integrate supplier’s resources and capabilities more closely. 
 
Klein and Rai’s (2009: 749–750) empirical results reveal that sharing strategic information 
(including production-related and financial information) can have positive effects on both 
parties' financial performance (improved asset management, reduced operational costs, and 
improved productivity) as well as operational performance (improved planning and 
flexibility, and increased resource control). 
Author 
& year
Research methods & 
data
Transparency 
types
Antecedents Benefits
Sacrifices 
(costs, risks)
Klein & 
Rai 
(2009)
Survey of 91 buyer-
supplier logistics 
relationships in the 
US (N=233); 
quantitative; 
structural equation 
modeling
Cost, Supply, 
Organizational, 
Strategic
Strategic information flows require 
trust, buyer dependence and 
buyer IT customization.
Sharing strategic information can 
have positive effects on both 
parties' financial performance 
(improved management of assets, 
reduced costs of operations, and 
enhanced productivity) and 
operational performance 
(improved planning, control, and 
flexibility of resources).
N/A
Frazier 
et al. 
(2009)
Survey of distributors 
in medical 
equipment, industrial 
equipment and 
industrial supplies 
industries in the US 
(N=479); quantitative; 
regression analysis
Strategic
Sharing of strategic information 
requires dependence asymmetry 
favoring distributor and 
relationship-specific investments. 
Furthermore, trust is required to 
share ISI and product-market 
familiarity enhances to share ESI.
N/A N/A
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2.4 Value in the buyer-supplier relationships 
The viewpoint in buyer-supplier relationships moves from costs to value when the 
necessary conditions for transparency in a buyer-supplier relationship have been reached. 
For example, the development potential for mutually beneficial outcomes has been 
identified, the opportunity costs have been calculated and the items for information sharing 
have been discussed in the relationship (Lamming et al. 2005: 560). In this part, the 
different aspects of value in buyer-supplier relationships are introduced in order to 
understand and analyze the value co-creating effects of transparency in buyer-supplier 
relationships. 
2.4.1 Different viewpoints for value creation 
Bowman and Ambrosini (2000: 4) describe that value creation consists of two components: 
exchange value (price paid by the customer) and perceived use value (the usefulness of the 
product for the customer). Lepak, Smith and Taylor (2007: 181–182) broaden this 
definition and describe that the exchange value is either the realized monetary amount 
when the exchange of product, good, service, or new task occur or the amount of the 
seller’s payment for the use value of the focal task, job, product, or service. Respectively, 
use value refers to the user’s need related to the specific quality of product, service, or new 
job. Furthermore, there are two important economic conditions for long term value 
creation. Firstly, the provider’s costs (e.g. money, effort, time) of the created value must be 
lower than the exchanged monetary amount. Secondly, the exchanged monetary amount is 
based on the user’s perceived performance differences between the new and the alternative 
product, service or task.  
 
Möller (2006: 915) presents that value creation in business-to-business context includes 
relational value and exchange value. Relational value relates to the value which is created 
through the activities that are interrelated between the customer and the supplier whereas 
exchange value occurs when the supplier uses its activities to create an offering which the 
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customer consumes. In the exchange value, the customer received the benefits of the 
offering by using its activities, competences and resources. Lastly, the value from the 
customer's viewpoint is the trade-off between benefits and sacrifices perceived by the 
customer. Contradict to that viewpoint, Vargo and Lusch (2004: 7, 2008a: 256–257) 
present the service-dominant logic (SDL) viewpoint. It changes the viewpoint from the 
tangible output and separate transactions towards services as the main processes for value 
creation during interaction with the customer. The goods are seen only as a distribution 
mechanism in value creation processes. They argue that the customer determines and 
perceives value as “value in use”. Therefore, suppliers cannot create value as embedded in 
the products and services which the customer destroys when using them. Moreover, 
suppliers can only make promises that their offering has potential value for the customer. 
 
Ford (2011: 232–236) describes the differences between the SDL and Industrial Marketing 
& Purchasing (IMP) Group’s viewpoints of value and points out that IMP Group 
understand value as the actor’s perception related to its specific problems and the realized 
benefits of solving them. Similarly with the SDL logic, he suggests that the actors perceive 
value in the business interactions but also in the long-term business relationships. 
Moreover, there is always trade-off to be made between the short-term episodic value and 
the long-term relationship value as well as between the relationships. He argues that 
episodic value can be realized within a particular interaction episode based on the actors’ 
specific problems and the ability to solve these. Furthermore, relationship value can be 
realized based on the relationship’s future potential to solve the actor’s problems and the 
problem solving capability of this particular relationship compared with the other 
relationships. 
 
Value in buyer-supplier relationships has been conceptualized as the factors which create 
value beyond products and services (Corsaro 2014: 986). This has related mostly to the best 
mix of benefits and sacrifices that provide the relationship value. For example, Walter, 
Ritter and Gemünden (2001: 366–368) states the supplier’s viewpoint of value and present 
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that suppliers can perceive relationship value (a trade-off between benefits and sacrifices) 
directly through higher volume, profit, and reliable customer relationship as well as 
indirectly through innovation development, valuable market reference and market 
information. Later, Ritter and Walter (2012: 137–142) study customer-perceived 
relationship value and argue that it is driven by direct, operation-based functions (financial / 
payment, quality, volume and the safeguard of the operations) which enhance the 
operational processes and operational excellence of the customer and have direct effect on 
customer’s profitability. They also present that supplier involvement through indirect, 
change-related functions (technical / market-based information, access to market actors, 
innovation development and employees’ motivation) can have negative impact on 
relationship value if the innovativeness of the customer is at the low level. Therefore, it is 
important that suppliers know the level of customers' innovativeness so that they can 
increase the customer’s perceived value also through indirect, change-related functions 
where the impact on profitability occurs later in the business relationship. 
 
Ulaga and Eggert (2006: 131) have conceptualized the relationship value as nine key 
differentiators: delivery performance, product quality and costs related to supplier’s 
offering; interaction, service and acquisition costs related to the sourcing process; and 
product introduction time, supplier’s knowledge and operational costs related to customer’s 
operations. Terpend et al. (2008: 40.) have reviewed the researches about relationship value 
over the past 20 years (151 journal articles) and categorize it into integration-based value 
(cooperation improvement, activity coordination, risk / opportunism reduction, knowledge 
acquisition / transfer), supplier capability-based value (continuous improvement, 
technology acquisition, new product development, global capability) and operational 
performance-based value (cost, quality, speed / lead time, flexibility, agility, delivery, 
inventory) which together forms the financial outcomes. They argue that operational 
performance-based value factors will remain important but capability-based and 
integration-based value factors will be more important in the future. 
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Corsaro and Snehota (2010: 987) argue that the relationship value assessments cannot be 
based only on the specific mix of criteria because the perceptions of value vary between the 
actors and these are dependent on each other resulting in continual change. Corsaro (2014: 
986) argue that previous studies seem to offer the very simplified view of value in business 
relationships. However, they state that there is a recent viewpoint where value is not 
understood as embedded in the provider’s offering, but is realized during the use of the 
offering (e.g. Vargo and Lusch 2008a: 256). Galvagno and Dalli (2014: 657–658) argue 
that business market and network theories could be useful approaches to broaden the 
service-dominant logic (SDL) concept by concentrating on long-term relationships and the 
specific context where value co-creation happens. 
2.4.2 Value co-creation 
Vargo and Lusch (2008b: 7) have developed the SDL concept and argues that the customer 
is always the value co-creator and because of that value creation happens only when 
suppliers and customers collaboratively (interactively) create value which is 
phenomenologically and uniquely evaluated based on its benefits. They also state that all 
exchange can be considered actor-to-actor (or B2B) in dynamic and networked service 
ecosystems because the actors are co-creating value through technology, institutions and 
language (Vargo and  Lusch 2011: 182). Furthermore, Echeverri and Skålen (2011: 364) 
find that value can be also co-destroyed at the provider-customer interface based on their 
empirical research. 
 
Value co-creation highlight the relationships development based on interaction (Prahalad 
and Ramaswamy 2004: 7; Payne, Storbacka & Frow 2008: 83). According to Grönroos 
(2011b: 240) value for the customer is realized based on the interaction within the 
relationship and are not related only to the tangible resources (i.e. products). Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy (2004: 9–11) introduce the DART model for value co-creation where dialog, 
access, risk-benefits, and transparency need to be aligned in order to better engage 
customers as collaborators. In the model, dialog helps to develop a shared solution where 
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the customer acts as a joint problem solver. Then meaningful dialog requires the access and 
transparency of information which leads to the assessment of the risks and benefits. 
However, this model is developed mainly for the Business-To-Consumer (B2C) context 
without considering the special characteristics of buyer-supplier relationships in the B2B 
context. 
 
Payne et al. (2008: 85–91) introduce the process-based value co-creation framework with 
both B2C and B2B viewpoints. In this framework, different tasks, procedures, activities, 
mechanisms, and interactions in three central processes (customer, supplier and encounter) 
support value co-creation. Furthermore, these processes enhance learning in the relationship 
which has an effect on future value co-creation. The customer’s value-creating processes 
help the customer to manage the business activities and the relationships with its suppliers 
whereas the supplier’s value-creating processes support the supplier’s co-creation with the 
customer. The supplier’s value-creating processes also help the suppliers to understand 
customer’s processes so that the supplier can better integrate its processes with the 
customer’s processes. Lastly, the encounter processes contain the exchange activities where 
the actors change their resources (e.g. products, work, information, time, money) as well as 
the collaboration activities where the actors work together. 
 
Grönroos (2011a: 280) criticizes SDL’s viewpoint of value to be too simple to theory 
development or decision making in practice. Therefore, he provides a developed viewpoint 
where the customer’s and the supplier’s different value co-creation roles are explained 
more detailed. Based on that developed viewpoint, value co-creation can occur only during 
direct interaction when supplier’s and customers’ processes are fully integrated and 
coordinated, otherwise the supplier can only produce the potential value for the customer 
(i.e. potential value in use) (Grönroos & Voima 2013: 145).  
 
Saarijärvi, Kannan and Kuusela (2013: 7, 10–12) criticize that the value co-creation 
concept lacks practical relevance to demonstrate how value co-creation can actually lead to 
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improved performance. They combine the different approaches for value co-creation and 
develop the framework for value co-creation by dividing it into three elements (“value”, 
“co” and “creation”). At first in the “value” element, value has to be explained for whom 
value is co-created and what type of value is co-created. Then in the “co” element, it is 
important to know which actors take part in the value co-creation, and especially what 
kinds of resources are used in the value co-creation process. Lastly in the “creation” 
element, it is crucial to describe and understand the different “co-processes” where the 
resources can be integrated for creating value to the specific actors and to fully understand 
the value co-creation mechanisms. 
 
Jaakkola and Hakanen (2013: 49–50) combine the different value co-creation approaches 
with IMP Group’s Actors-Resources-Activities (ARA) framework. They conceptualized 
the value co-creation in B2B context as collaborative and continuous process with three 
different levels: actor, relationship and network. At the actor level, actors execute activities 
when they provide and receive resources as well as perceive benefits and sacrifices (i.e. 
actor’s value creation processes). At the relationship level, value co-creation occurs when 
actors interact and collaborate whereas at the network level it occurs through resource 
integration resulting in a big resource combination based on actors’ activity patterns in the 
network. 
2.4.3 Value capture 
Value capture (or value appropriation) refers to the relative share that each actor is able to 
capture from the total net value (i.e. outcomes minus inputs) that is mutually created with 
the other actor (Wagner, Eggert & Lindemann 2010: 841). Therefore, when the other actor 
captures a larger share of the created total value it reduces another actor’s share of this co-
created value. Furthermore, an individual company can capture more value based on the 
excellent value creation activities with the other actors, the excellent value capturing 
possibilities, or using both options at the same time. 
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Cox (2004b: 412–413) argue that the problems in the buyer-supplier transactions can occur 
when both actors have the similar targets for value capture (i.e. profits) but have different 
commercial and operational targets. For example, the customer always tries to capture 
value from supply activities operationally by increasing quality, delivery accuracy and 
performance as well as commercially by reducing the total costs of ownership. 
Respectively, the supplier is trying to capture value from supply activities operationally by 
delivering products and / or services in order to increase the possible revenue from the 
customer and commercially by having as high prices (or margins) as possible with the 
given functional level of the delivered products and / or services. These differences lead to 
conflicts and tensions in a relationship when the best outcome to other actor decreases 
another’s possibilities to receive the best outcome. 
 
Cox (2004b: 415–417) describes nine different outcomes that can happen in the exchange 
between the actors in buyer-supplier relationships. Only one of these outcomes can be a 
true win-win outcome where the customer and the supplier can completely achieve their 
value capture goals. However, this kind of mutually ideal outcome is not possible in 
practice because the actors have different operational and commercial goals. There can still 
be many mutually beneficial win-win situations where the actors can achieve at least some 
of their goals although the other actor captures more value. Furthermore, there are 
possibilities for the other actor to use its strong power positions to capture value from win-
lose situations with the short term relationships if the other actor wants to operate in this 
way. Moreover, the risk of actors’ power positions to move against them should be 
acceptable in these kinds of win-lose situations. For example, there can be situation where 
the supplier has a strategy to push its competitors away, or it aims to form a brand 
association with some leading-edge customer to gain profits from the higher prices with the 
other customers. 
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2.5 Synthesis of the theoretical background 
This part synthesizes the theoretical background of this study and presents a framework that 
can be used as a basis for empirical study. At first, each part of the theoretical background 
is summarized and analyzed. Then these are combined together by synthesizing them into a 
framework for value co-creation through relationship transparency. In addition, the needed 
hypotheses for empirical study are developed. The analysis and conclusions are based on 
the author’s own interpretation. 
2.5.1 Supply chain collaboration 
Previous studies indicate that close collaborative relationships between the actors within the 
supply chain are desirable because these provide many different benefits for the actors. 
However, there is also criticism that close collaboration is not always the best way and 
there is a need to find an appropriate way to manage different supplier relationships in the 
specific situations (Cox 2004a: 349). In some situations it can be beneficial to have a close 
collaborative relationship whereas in the other situations an arm’s length market-based 
relationship can be better.  
 
When a collaborative relationship is chosen, it requires joint activities between the partners 
as well as relationship with the high level of trust and commitment. Based on the previous 
studies, information sharing is usually understood as one of the most important 
collaborative activities along with the relationship-specific investments. Successful 
collaboration usually results in improved operational and financial performance (e.g. Min et 
al. 2006: 250; Das et al. 2006: 572–573; Cao & Zhang 2011: 175–177). However, there are 
also risks to the increased costs of coordination and inflexibilities as well as the lack of 
improved business or performance for suppliers (Das et al. 2006: 576–579; Nyaga et al. 
2010: 109–110). 
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2.5.2 Interaction and relationship integration 
As Gadde and Snehota (2000: 315) argue, that the most of the potential benefits from 
suppliers can be acquired through close relationship integration which requires the activity 
coordination, interpersonal interactions, and the mutual resource adaptations. All of these 
cause costs for both companies but these can provide the greater benefits if used in a 
suitable customer or supplier relationship.  
 
Usually, integration can be viewed through three dimensions: relational capital (or social 
capital), relationship structures and relationship-specific investments (Vesalainen & 
Kohtamäki (2015: 108). These dimensions form various configurations where the 
dimensions may be simultaneously present in the relationship. For example, relationship 
structures (e.g. the organizational routines and IT systems) can create the platform for 
interactions between companies as well as with the relational capital it can create 
improvements in relationship performance (Kohtamäki et al. 2012: 1306). Respectively, 
relationship-specific investments (e.g. allocated resources to the specific relationship which 
are difficult to use in the other relationship) can improve operational performance. 
Relationship-specific investments can also lead to the long-term commitment and enhance 
information sharing in the relationships which lead to the more valuable resources within 
the relationship (Laaksonen et al. 2008: 916). Lastly, relational capital (e.g. trust) can 
improve operational performance based on its ability to improve interactions, and 
knowledge creation and sharing (Kohtamäki et al. 2012: 1306). However, the very high 
level of social capital can also have negative effects such as the risk of opportunism, the 
loss of objectivity, resource misallocation and negative dependences (Villena et al. 2011: 
572; Day et al. 2013: 160–161). 
 
As integration refers to the relationship’s depth, interaction is seen as the main process that 
occurs within the relationship (Vesalainen and Kohtamäki 2015: 108). Interaction can be 
seen to contain material, human and financial aspects as well as actor, activity and resource 
elements which can change and transform during interaction (Ford et al. 2010: 88). In the 
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value creation (or value-in-use) perspective, interaction allows the supplier to work together 
with the customer in order to have direct effects on the outcomes of customer’s value-
creating processes and therefore co-create value during interaction (Grönroos 2011b: 244). 
However, this kind of value co-creation during interaction depends on the quality of the 
interaction such as the supplier’s ability to use the interaction in the most beneficial way. 
2.5.3 Relationship transparency 
Relationship transparency refers to the two-way exchange of sensitive information in 
collaborative, long-term relationships (Cox 2004a: 349–353; Lamming et al. (2004: 293–
294). Based on the literature study, transparency has five different types with the related 
concepts such as cost transparency (incl. open-book accounting), supply transparency (incl. 
supply chain visibility), technological transparency (incl. supplier involvement in NPD), 
organizational transparency, and strategic transparency.  
 
Previous studies on relationship transparency (presented in Chapter 2.3) indicate that 
typically transparency requires trust, commitment, information technology, relationship-
specific investments and a long-term relationship. According to previous empirical studies, 
it can bring many benefits such as increase customer’s perceived value (Eggert and Helm 
2003: 106–107.), help the creation of valuable offering and eliminate waste (i.e. non-value 
adding activities) (Lamming et al. 2005: 558–561), help to solve problems in the flows of 
materials and product development (Hultman and Axelsson 2007: 633–634) as well as 
provide costs reductions in products and manufacturing processes (Kajüter and Kulmala 
2005: 200; Suomala et al. 2010: 87–88; Agndal and Nilsson’s 2010: 158; Alenius et al. 
2015: 204).  
 
However, it also has sacrifices (e.g. costs and risks) such as the very high level of 
transparency can decrease satisfaction and increase uncertainty if the actor does not know 
how it can use the new information (Eggert & Helm 2003: 106–107). Moreover, too much 
information from the customer can cause delivery problems to the supplier (Zhou & Benton 
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2007: 1361). Cost transparency can also be at too high level and be too costly to control 
certain tasks or be at too low level to control other tasks (Caglio & Ditillo 2012: 69–73). 
Furthermore, transparency contains the risk of opportunism such as information leakages to 
the competitors or it can be misused for the receiver’s own good (Lamming et al. 2005: 
558–561; Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Suomala et al. 2010: 91–93). These realized 
sacrifices indicate that transparency needs to be balanced rather than maximized in the 
specific buyer-supplier relationship in order to realize all of its value-creating effects. 
2.5.4 Value co-creation in the buyer-supplier relationships 
Lamming et al. (2005: 560) argue that the viewpoint in a buyer-supplier relationship moves 
from costs to value when the necessary conditions for transparent buyer-supplier 
relationships have been reached (e.g. identified development potential, calculated 
opportunity costs and discussed items for information sharing). Value in buyer-supplier 
relationships has usually understood as the trade-off between various benefits and sacrifices 
related to the specific value-creating factors (Corsaro 2014: 986). The relationship value 
can be categorized into the integration-based, supplier capability-based, and operational 
performance-based value factors which form the financial outcomes (Terpend et al. 2008: 
40). However, only these kind of given factors may not be appropriate to evaluate relational 
outcomes because value perceptions vary between the actors and these are dependent on 
each other that lead to continual change (Corsaro and Snehota 2010: 987). 
 
There is also a developing viewpoint where value is understood as “value in use”. Based on 
that viewpoint, the supplier cannot create value as embedded in the products and / or 
services but it can co-create value when it interacts with the customer (Vargo & Lusch 
2008a: 257–258). This kind of interactive value co-creation means that the supplier works 
together with the customer where it can have direct effects on customer’s value-creating 
processes (Grönroos 2011b: 243–245). Without the interactions, the supplier has only the 
ability to facilitate the customer’s creation of value by providing potential value. Jaakkola 
and Hakanen (2013: 49–50) conceptualized the value co-creation in B2B context as 
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collaborative and continuous process at three different levels. Firstly, actors execute 
activities when they provide and receive resources in their value creation processes as well 
as perceive benefits and sacrifices. Secondly, value co-creation occurs within the 
relationship when actors interact and collaborate. Lastly, value co-creation occurs at the 
network level when the resources are integrated in a way that leads to a big resource 
combination based on actors’ activity patterns in the network. 
2.5.5 Framework for value co-creation through relationship transparency 
Based on the summarized and analyzed theories, Figure 1 below presents a framework for 
value co-creation through relationship transparency. The framework combines the concepts 
of relationship interaction and integration with value co-creation. Furthermore, it adds 
relationship transparency as one of the important issues to these concepts. 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework for value co-creation through relationship transparency 
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Interaction in the framework is seen as the collaborative process within the relationship 
where actors have abilities to impact on another actor’s processes and which has effects on 
the level of integration between the actors in terms of relational capital, relationship-
specific investments and relationship structures. This viewpoint is based especially on the 
previous studies of Grönroos (2011b: 243), Ford & Mouzas (2013: 435–436) and 
Vesalainen & Kohtamäki (2015: 108). Furthermore, the framework adds relationship 
transparency as one additional aspect within the interaction. The framework suggests that 
the above mentioned relationship integration dimensions can have effects on the level of 
relationship transparency. This suggestion is tested empirically by the research question 2: 
What are the antecedents for transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships? 
 
This suggestion is supported by the previous empirical studies which presents that 
relationship structures can create a forum for interactions and facilitate knowledge sharing 
(Kohtamäki et al. 2012: 1301). Furthermore, information technology has been presented to 
be one of the most important antecedents for transparency (e.g. Hultman & Axelsson 2007: 
634; Caglio & Ditillo 2012: 69). Laaksonen et al. (2008: 916) argue that relationship-
specific investments can result in the long-term commitment through annual contracts and 
increased information sharing (Laaksonen et al. 2008: 916). Furthermore, relationship-
specific investments are seen to be an important antecedent for transparency (Walter 2003: 
728; Johnsen 2009: 193; Frazier et al. 2009: 38–40; Möller et al. 2012: 126–129). Lastly, 
Kohtamäki et al. (2012: 1306) argue that relational capital can improve interactions as well 
as creation and sharing knowledge. In addition, trust is one of the most common 
antecedents for transparency (Lamming et al. 2001: 6; Walter 2003: 728; Hultman & 
Axelsson 2007: 634; Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Akkermans et al. 2004: 448; Barratt & 
Oke 2007: 524; Squire et al. 2009: 472; Klein & Rai 2009: 38: Frazier et al. 2009: 749; Lee 
et al. 2014: 290) along with commitment (Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Barratt & Oke 
2007: 524; Walter 2003: 728).  
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The framework applies Grönroos’s (2011b: 243–244) as well as Jaakkola and Hakanen’s 
(2013: 49–50) viewpoints on value co-creation. Based on these viewpoints, value co-
creation happens only during interaction when supplier’s and customer’s processes occur 
simultaneously. This interactive collaboration allows the customer to impact on the 
supplier's processes and the supplier to impact on the customer's processes in a value 
creating way (i.e. create more benefits than sacrifices). Without the existence of interaction, 
the supplier can only provide the potential value for the customer by delivering the 
resources through arm’s length transaction (i.e. value facilitation). Respectively, the 
customer creates value independently during the use of the purchased resources to execute 
activities within its processes whereby perceiving more benefits than sacrifices.  
 
The framework suggests that the relationship transparency can have effects on the quality 
of interaction and therefore value co-creation (i.e. how well the actors can use the shared 
information during interaction in order to enhance value co-creation). In this research, value 
co-creation is viewed as a collaborative process where the customer and the supplier create 
value (i.e. both actors perceive more benefits than sacrifices) during interaction. These 
perceived benefits and sacrifices can vary significantly based on the actors’ perceptions of 
the value-creating effects of transparency. However, the most of the value-creating effects 
can be related to integration-based, capability-based, operational performance-based and 
financial-based value factors following the categorization by Terpend et al. (2008: 40). 
Terpend et al. (2008: 40) categorizes value in the relationships mainly from customer’s 
perspective whereas this research studies value from customer’s and supplier’s perspectives 
as value co-creation.  This research also suggests that the different types of transparency 
(e.g. cost, supply, organizational, technological and strategic) can have various effects on 
value co-creation. This relates to the previous empirical findings that transparency needs to 
be balanced rather than maximized in the specific buyer-supplier relationship to avoid its 
risks (Eggert & Helm 2003: 103; Hultman & Axelsson 2007: 634). These suggestions 
relate to the research question 3: How can transparency have effects on value co-creation in 
the buyer-supplier relationships?  
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3 RESEARCH METHODS 
This research was a multiple method research which uses quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Therefore, triangulation was used to ensure the validity of the research (i.e. 
research explored what was intended to explore) by combining the multiple sources of 
quantitative and qualitative data (Saunders et al. 2012: 180, 192–193). Furthermore, the 
reliability of the research (i.e. ensuring the repeatable and consistent findings) was taken 
into account by documenting and using the research methods appropriately. The research 
data from the interviews was recorded and transcribed with the basic level of transcription. 
In addition, the quality of the used literature was ensured by selecting the academic articles 
mostly from the top rated academic journals and rating the publication years. 
 
The research strategy was a case study containing the lead company and its 24 most 
important suppliers. Empirical case study was chosen because it allows rich understanding 
about a topic or phenomenon within its context or some real-life situations and it can 
answer the questions such as why, what and how with using quantitative and/or qualitative 
research methods (Saunders et al. 2012: 179–180.). More specifically the research was an 
embedded single case study where different buyer-supplier relationships formed the 
multiple units of analysis. It was chosen because the subunits provide opportunities for an 
extensive analysis and enhance the insight into the single case (Yin 2014: 56). In this case, 
it allowed replicating the findings across different buyer-supplier relationships in the supply 
network. This study contained three embedded cases which are three different supplier 
groups (contract manufacturers, technology suppliers and subcontractors) in the supply 
network. The companies in the same supplier group have quite similar buyer-supplier 
relationships and therefore these formed an embedded case. 
 
The primary research data was collected from semi-structured interviews. The secondary 
research data had been collected from the web-based structured questionnaires from the 
customer and its 24 suppliers. The data had been collected for the research project related to 
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the supply network performance measurement system carried out by the research group 
Networked Value Systems at the University of Vaasa. This research project was part of 
REBUS (Towards relational business practices) research program carried out by FIMECC 
(Finnish Metals and Engineering Competence Cluster). The author had participated in the 
development of web-based structured questionnaires as well as data collection and analysis. 
This secondary data was used to get the quantitative data about the current level of 
transparency between the lead company and its 24 suppliers. The web-based questionnaire 
contained questions about the level of transparency for the lead company and its suppliers 
in a scale 1–5. After that, the primary and qualitative research data about the antecedents 
for transparency as well as the effects of transparency on value co-creation were collected 
from the in-depth semi-structured interviews (14 interviews with duration of 45–75 min) 
for the key managers and supply professionals of the lead company and the upper 
management of eight important suppliers from three different supplier groups. Table 8 
below presents the interviewees. 
 
Table 8. The interviewees. 
 
 
In the interviews, the conversation was allowed to flow freely within the given themes. The 
interviews were conducted with using laddering and cognitive mapping -techniques. 
Laddering technique is based on means-end theory and it was originally developed to get 
the understanding about how consumers change the product attributes into meaningful 
Lead company (N=6): Suppliers (N=8):
Lead company - Vice President, Purchasing Contract Manufacturer 1 - Business Director
Lead company - Vice President, R&D Contract Manufacturer 2 - CEO
Lead company - Manager, Sourcing Contract Manufacturer 3 - CFO & Deputy CEO
Lead company - Operational Buyer 1 Technology Supplier 1 - Sales Manager
Lead company - Operational Buyer 2 Technology Supplier 2 - CEO
Lead company - Strategic Buyer Subcontractor 1 - CEO
Subcontractor 2 - CEO
Subcontractor 3 - CEO
60 
 
connections (Gutman 1982: 62–63). In the laddering technique, the interviewer uses a 
directed probing questions such as “Why is this important to you?” in order to describe the 
connections related to the interviewee’s perceptions about the attributes, consequences and 
values (Reunolds & Gutman 1988: 12–13). These directed probing questions (e.g. why) 
result in the ladder of answers which lead to the higher abstraction levels and can result in 
the various means-end chains of different length (Sørensen & Askegaard 2007: 65). In 
addition, causal mapping technique (also called cognitive mapping) was used with the 
laddering technique in order to form the graphical causal maps representing individual 
understanding about a particular issue. This technique helps to handle the large amount of 
qualitative information as well as can improve the interview process (Ahmad & Ali 2003: 
3–4). 
 
In this research, the interviewer used a series of directed probing questions such as what it 
causes, where it leads, what it effects and why until the interviewee cannot give the new 
answers anymore. The aim was to get a number of cause-effect chains of varying length 
which represents the antecedents for transparency as well as the value-creating effects of 
transparency. The graphical causal maps were formed during the interviews and later these 
were sent to the interviewee for review after the transcription of the interview and the 
clarification of the causal maps. All interviews were recorded and transcribed if the 
interviewee gave the permit (13/14 gave the permit). The interview guide in the Appendices 
presents the interview procedures in the more detailed way. 
 
In the data analysis phase, the research data for the first research question was analyzed 
quantitatively by using descriptive statistics. The data analysis was done by using SAS 
Enterprise Guide software. For the second and third research questions, the qualitative 
analysis was conducted by analyzing causal maps. According to Clarke and Mackaness 
(2001: 154) causal map analysis can be conducted by analyzing the content of the maps 
(i.e. the meaning which they embody) and the complexity of configuration. In this study, 
the interviewees’ causal maps were compared in order to form the causal maps presenting 
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the most usual cause-effects chains related to value-creating effects of transparency and the 
antecedents for transparency. Table 9 below demonstrates how the data collection methods 
and data analysis procedures relate to research questions. 
 
Table 9. Data collection and analysis related to research questions. 
 
  
Research questions: Data collection methods:
Data analysis 
procedures:
RQ1 What is the level of transparency 
in the supply network?
Secondary data had been 
collected from the customer 
and its 24 suppliers by 
using the web-based 
structured questionnaires
Descriptive statistics
RQ2 What are the antecedents for 
transparency in the buyer-supplier 
relationships?
14 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with using 
laddering and causal 
mapping techniques
Causal map analysis
RQ3 How can transparency have 
effects on value co-creation in the 
buyer-supplier relationships?
14 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with using 
laddering and causal 
mapping techniques
Causal map analysis
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4 RESEARCH RESULTS 
This chapter introduces the research results by following the order of the research 
questions. At first, the findings about the level of transparency in the supply network are 
introduced. Then the findings about the antecedents for transparency are presented. Lastly, 
the findings about the value-creating effects of transparency are described. 
4.1 Level of transparency in the supply network 
This part introduces the research results related to the first research question that deals with 
the level of transparency in the supply network. The objective of this research question is to 
describe the current levels of different transparency types in different buyer-supplier 
relationships in the supply network. 
 
Table 10 and Figure 2 below indicate the levels of transparency types in the supply 
network. The results show that organizational transparency is at the highest level whereas 
cost transparency is at the lowest level in the supply network. Furthermore, supply, 
technological and strategic transparencies are at moderate level. Of these three types, 
technological transparency is at the highest followed by supply transparency.  
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Table 10. The levels of transparency types in the supply network. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The levels of transparency types in the supply network. 
 
  
Type N Obs Std Dev Minimum Maximum Lower Q Median Mean Upper Q
Cost / Price 24 0,602 1,1 3,6 1,7 2,1 2,2 2,5
Supply 24 0,525 1,8 3,8 2,8 3,0 2,9 3,3
Organizational 24 0,514 2,3 4,3 3,3 3,7 3,6 4,0
Technological 24 0,444 2,3 4,3 2,9 3,3 3,3 3,6
Strategic 24 0,509 1,9 4,0 2,5 2,9 2,8 3,1
Transparency 24 0,447 1,9 3,9 2,6 3,0 3,0 3,3
Analysis Variable : Transparency
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Table 11 and Figure 3 below show the level of cost transparency in different supplier 
groups from suppliers’ and customer’s viewpoints. Overall, the cost transparency is at a 
low level. The results show that the customer has very limited information related to 
technology suppliers’ costs except one technology supplier whose costs are very 
transparent to the customer. 
 
Table 11. The level of cost transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The level of cost transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
 
Group N Obs Variable Std Dev Minimum Maximum Lower Q Median Mean Upper Q
Cont. Man. (S) 9 0,668 1,6 3,3 1,8 2,5 2,4 3,0
Cont. Man. (C) 9 0,500 1,5 3,0 2,0 2,0 2,2 2,5
Tech. Sup. (S) 8 0,678 1,3 3,3 2,0 2,5 2,4 3,0
Tech. Sup. (C) 8 1,061 1,0 4,0 1,0 1,0 1,6 2,0
Subcont. (S) 7 0,661 1,3 3,0 1,5 2,3 2,3 2,8
Subcont. (C) 7 0,673 1,5 3,0 1,5 2,0 2,1 3,0
Cost / Price 
Transparency
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Table 12 and Figure 4 below show the level of supply transparency in different supplier 
groups from suppliers’ and customer’s viewpoints. The results indicate that supply 
transparency in contract manufacturers perceived by the customer and the supplier is at a 
moderate level whereas in subcontractors it is at quite a low level. Furthermore, technology 
suppliers feel more informed about customer’s supply activities than the other way. 
 
Table 12. The level of supply transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The level of supply transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
Group N Obs Variable Std Dev Minimum Maximum Lower Q Median Mean Upper Q
Cont. Man. (S) 9 0,651 2,0 4,0 2,7 2,8 3,0 3,7
Cont. Man. (C) 9 0,325 2,8 3,8 3,0 3,0 3,2 3,5
Tech. Sup. (S) 8 0,853 2,0 4,3 2,5 3,2 3,2 4,0
Tech. Sup. (C) 8 0,626 1,5 3,3 2,3 2,9 2,7 3,1
Subcont. (S) 7 0,535 2,0 3,3 2,3 3,0 2,9 3,3
Subcont. (C) 7 0,374 2,0 3,0 2,3 2,5 2,6 3,0
Supply 
Transparency
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Table 13 and Figure 5 below show the level of organizational transparency in different 
supplier groups from suppliers’ and customer’s viewpoints. The level of organizational 
transparency is rather high but it varies significantly. Especially technology suppliers’ and 
subcontractors’ perception about the transparency of customer’s organization varies from 
the very low level (2,0) to the very high level (4,7). 
 
Table 13. The level of organizational transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The level of organizational transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
Group N Obs Variable Std Dev Minimum Maximum Lower Q Median Mean Upper Q
Cont. Man. (S) 9 0,706 2,0 4,3 3,0 3,3 3,2 3,3
Cont. Man. (C) 9 0,412 3,0 4,3 3,7 4,0 3,8 4,0
Tech. Sup. (S) 8 0,816 2,3 4,7 2,7 3,2 3,3 4,0
Tech. Sup. (C) 8 0,486 3,0 4,7 3,8 4,0 4,0 4,2
Subcont. (S) 7 0,957 2,0 4,7 2,3 3,3 3,2 4,0
Subcont. (C) 7 0,848 2,3 4,7 3,3 4,3 4,0 4,7
Organizational 
Transparency
67 
 
Table 14 and Figure 6 below show the level of technological transparency in different 
supplier groups from suppliers’ and customer’s viewpoints. Overall, technological 
transparency is at a moderate level. The results indicate that the customer has rather high 
transparency level of contract manufacturers’ technologies whereas the suppliers’ 
perceptions of transparency vary a lot from the very low level (1,7) to the extremely high 
level (5,0). 
 
Table 14. The level of technological transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The level of technological transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
Group N Obs Variable Std Dev Minimum Maximum Lower Q Median Mean Upper Q
Cont. Man. (S) 9 0,932 1,7 5,0 2,7 2,8 3,1 3,7
Cont. Man. (C) 9 0,453 2,8 4,3 3,5 3,8 3,6 4,0
Tech. Sup. (S) 8 0,589 2,3 4,0 3,2 3,5 3,5 4,0
Tech. Sup. (C) 8 0,265 2,8 3,5 3,0 3,3 3,2 3,3
Subcont. (S) 7 0,686 1,7 3,7 2,7 3,0 2,9 3,7
Subcont. (C) 7 0,345 2,8 3,5 2,8 3,3 3,2 3,5
Technological 
Transparency
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Table 15 and Figure 7 shows the level of strategic transparency in different supplier groups 
from suppliers’ and customer’s viewpoints. The results indicate that the customer has the 
highest level of transparency on contract manufacturers’ and subcontractors’ strategic 
issues whereas suppliers’ perceptions on customer’s strategic issues are at the lower level. 
However, technology suppliers feel more informed about customer’s strategic issues than 
the other way. 
 
Table 15. The level of strategic transparency in the supplier groups. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The level of strategic transparency in the supplier groups. 
  
Group N Obs Variable Std Dev Minimum Maximum Lower Q Median Mean Upper Q
Cont. Man. (S) 9 0,677 1,5 3,8 2,3 2,5 2,6 3,0
Cont. Man. (C) 9 0,651 2,3 3,8 2,5 3,5 3,1 3,8
Tech. Sup. (S) 8 0,691 2,3 4,0 2,5 2,9 3,1 3,8
Tech. Sup. (C) 8 0,641 2,0 4,0 2,3 2,8 2,8 3,0
Subcont. (S) 7 0,497 1,5 3,0 2,0 2,5 2,4 2,8
Subcont. (C) 7 0,787 2,3 4,3 2,3 3,0 3,1 3,8
Strategic 
Transparency
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4.2 Antecedents for transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships 
This part introduces the research results related to the second research question about the 
antecedents for transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships. The results from the 
interviews are presented in causal maps representing the interviewees’ beliefs about the 
antecedents for transparency. The customer representatives’ (N=6) and supplier 
representatives’ (N=8) individual causal maps have been combined into one causal map 
because their causal beliefs did not vary significantly. The numbers inside the text area 
present how many interviewees have the same antecedent whereas the numbers between the 
text areas present how many interviewees have similar causal belief. 
 
Figure 8 below indicates the causal map of cost transparency which shows that the trust 
(9/14) is the most usual antecedent for cost transparency. Related to trust, the interviewees 
believe that the contracts that secure the information (5/14) as well as transparent 
organizational culture (4/14) are other usual antecedents for cost transparency. Moreover, 
these two antecedents usually precede trust. Furthermore, cost accounting systems (4/14) 
and clear cost calculation methods (4/14) are also usual antecedents for cost transparency. 
 
Cost accounting 
systems 4
Appropriate 
human resources 
for cost accounting 
2
Fair and honest 
behavior 3
Contracts that 
secure the 
information 
sharing 5
Long-term 
relationship / 
successful 
collaboration 3
Trust 9
Transparent 
organizational 
cultures  4
3 1
Big exchange 
volume or its 
future growth 2
2
Arranged methods for 
information sharing 3
Clear cost 
calculation 
methods 4
2
2
3
2 9
2
22
COST TRANSPARENCY - Antecedents (N=14)
3
3
1
 
Figure 8. Antecedents for cost transparency. 
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The most usual antecedent for supply transparency is Information Technology (IT) -
systems for information sharing (7/14) as Figure 9 below indicates. The interviewees also 
believe that trust (4/14) is another important antecedent for supply transparency. The 
arranged methods for information sharing (4/14) are also a quite usual antecedent that 
precedes the clear processes for information sharing (4/14). Some of the interviewees also 
believe that there is a need to have willingness to share, receive and use information (4/14). 
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Figure 9. Antecedents for supply transparency. 
 
Antecedents for organizational transparency are quite clear for all interviewees as the 
causal map in Figure 10 below indicates. The most of the interviewees believe that 
arranged methods for information sharing (9/14) are the needed antecedent for 
organizational transparency. Some of the interviewees also believe that IT-systems for 
information sharing (4/14) and clear organizational structures (4/14) are needed. 
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Figure 10. Antecedents for organizational transparency. 
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Figure 11 below demonstrates the causal map of technological transparency. The most 
usual antecedents for technological transparency are trust (9/14) along with contracts that 
secure the information sharing (7/14) and arranged methods for product development 
(5/14).   
 
Trust 9
Contracts that secure the 
information sharing 7
Arranged methods for 
product development 5
Appropriate 
resources for 
product 
development  3
2
3
TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSPARENCY - Antecedents (N=14)
9
5 4
1
 
Figure 11. Antecedents for technological transparency. 
 
Antecedents for strategic transparency are usually believed to be regular strategic 
discussions between the parties (9/14) that require concrete strategies for both parties (4/14) 
as Figure 12 below demonstrates. Another usual antecedents are trust (7/14) and 
strategically important supplier or customer (4/14). 
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Figure 12. Antecedents for strategic transparency. 
 
Lastly, the causal map in Figure 13 below combines these previous five different causal 
maps into one causal map presenting antecedents for transparency in general. The results 
indicate that the most usual antecedents for transparency are trust (32/70) and the arranged 
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methods for information sharing (24/70). Furthermore, contracts that secure the information 
sharing (14/70) and transparent organizational cultures (10/70) are common which are also 
believe to precede trust along with the successful long-term collaboration (5/70). Usually, 
the interviewees also believe that appropriate human resources for information sharing 
(8/70), IT-systems for information sharing (11/70) and regular strategic discussions (9/70) 
are needed in order to receive relationship transparency. 
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Figure 13. Antecedents for transparency. 
4.3 Value-creating effects of transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships 
This part introduces the research results related to the third research question about the 
value-creating effects of transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships. The results from 
the interviews are presented in causal maps representing the interviewees’ beliefs about the 
benefits and sacrifices of transparency. Similar than with the antecedents for transparency, 
customer’s representatives (N=6) and supplier’s representatives (N=8) individual causal 
maps are combined into one causal map because their beliefs did not have major 
differences. The numbers inside the text area demonstrate the amount of the interviewees 
which believe the same effect whereas the numbers between the text areas demonstrate how 
many interviewees have similar causal belief. The value-creating effects are presented by 
following with the Terpend et al. (2008: 40.) categorization of relationship value but it is 
extended so that the customer’s and supplier’s perspectives are taken into account. 
73 
 
COST TRANSPARENCY
Information shared by the customer (N=14)
COST TRANSPARENCY
Information shared by the supplier (N=14)
Supplier’s costs 
awareness improves 
6
Collaboration for cost 
reductions improves 11
The supplier 
can justify its 
prices better 3
Supplier’s 
competitiveness 
improves 4
The price of 
supplier’s product 
declines 5
Customer’s profitability 
improves 8
Customer’s revenue 
grows 3
Benefits of cost 
reduction can be 
shared evenly 5
Supplier’s profitability 
improves 8
Total costs reduce 12
Customer’s 
competitiveness 
improves 8
The exchange with the 
supplier increases 7
Supplier’s revenue 
grows 4
5
4
3
Supplier’s weak 
efficiency can be 
revealed 4
Supplier’s 
revenue 
decreases 5
Supplier’s 
profitability 
decreases 5
Deliveries can go 
to supplier’s 
competitors 6
Trust 
increases 2
Collaboration 
increases 2
2
10
3
2
2
3
5
4
4
6
6
Information can 
leak to supplier’s 
competitors  5
The 
competitors 
can utilize 
information 3
3
3
5
4
4
Trust 
decreases 2
Collaboration 
decreases 2
Contracts can be broken / 
information can be used 
opportunistically 2
Information 
can leak to 
customer’s 
competitors 2
The 
competitors 
can utilize 
information
Customer’s 
competitiveness 
decreases
Customer’s 
revenue 
decreases
Customer’s 
profitability 
decreases 2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
22
3
3
5
3
3
2
+&- + +
-
+ ---
13
3
Financial-based Value
Operational Performance-based Value
Capability-based Value
Integration-based Value
=
= =
=
 
Figure 14. Value-creating effects of cost transparency. 
 
The causal map in Figure 14 above indicates that transparent cost information shared by the 
customer leads to benefits such as supplier’s improved costs awareness (6/14) which then 
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improves collaboration for cost reductions (11/14) and results in total cost reductions 
(12/14). Similarly, transparent cost information shared by the supplier leads to improved 
collaboration for cost reductions. For example, the interviewees believe that it allows the 
customer to help and direct the supplier to reduce costs. These benefits create capability-
based value in terms of supplier’s improved costs awareness and integration-based value in 
terms of improved collaboration for cost reductions which then leads to operational 
performance-based value as total costs reduce. 
 
The interviewees usually believe that reduced total costs lead to the declining price of 
supplier’s product (5/14) which has positive effects on customer’s profitability (8/14). 
Reduced total costs improve especially customer’s competitiveness (8/14) that also 
increases the exchange with the supplier (7/14) through customer’s growing revenue (3/14). 
The increased exchange leads to supplier’s revenue growth (4/14) and lastly to supplier’s 
improved profitability (8/14). Furthermore, both parties can improve profitability by 
sharing the benefits of cost reduction activities evenly (5/14). These benefits relate to 
operational performance-based value (e.g. reduced costs and improved competitiveness) 
that leads to financial-based value in terms of increased revenue and improved profitability. 
In addition, cost transparency helps the parties to capture the created value evenly so that 
both parties’ profitability improves. 
 
The causal map indicates that the sacrifices of cost transparency are believed to happen 
more often to the supplier than to the customer. The interviewees usually believe that when 
the supplier shares cost information transparently, this information can leak to supplier’s 
competitors (5/14) or supplier’s weak efficiency can be revealed (4/14) causing the 
situation where the deliveries go to supplier’s competitors (6/14). Furthermore, this 
decreases supplier’s revenue (5/14) which then decreases supplier’s profitability (5/14). 
These negative effects destroy integration-based value when information can leak or the 
deliveries can go to supplier’s competitors which then destroys financial-based value 
(supplier’s decreased revenue and profitability). 
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Figure 15. Value-creating effects of supply transparency. 
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Figure 15 above demonstrates the causal map of supply transparency. It indicates that 
transparent supply information shared by the customer leads to the benefits that can be 
realized by supplier’s improved production planning (13/14) that leads to supplier’s 
improved delivery accuracy (13/14) often through supplier’s improved resource usage 
(8/14). The supplier’s improved delivery accuracy leads to supplier’s improved 
competitiveness (4/14) as well as decreased unnecessary work or rush orders (5/14) that 
reduced supplier’s costs (7/14). Furthermore, supplier’s reduced costs lead to supplier’s 
improved profitability (8/14) and customer’s improved profitability (8/14) through 
supplier’s lower product prices (4/14). These benefits relate to capability-based value in 
terms of supplier’s improved production planning and resource usage that then leads to 
operational performance-based value in terms of supplier’s improved delivery accuracy, 
decreased unnecessary work or rush orders and competitiveness as well as reduced costs. 
Finally, financial-based value is created for both parties in terms of improved profitability. 
 
The interviewees believe that transparent supply information shared by the supplier brings 
benefits such as customer’s improved supply chain management (9/14) which leads to 
customer’s improved production planning (4/14) which then improves delivery accuracy 
(9/14). Lastly these improvements lead to customer’s or supply chain’s reduced costs (9/14) 
when unnecessary work or rush deliveries decrease (5/14). The interviewees usually 
believed that reduced costs lead to improvements in customer’s competitiveness (5/14) and 
customer’s profitability (8/14). Some of the interviewees also believe that the exchange 
with the supplier increases (3/14) when supplier’s and customer’s competitiveness 
improves. Moreover, increased exchange is believed to result in supplier’s improved 
profitability through customer’s increased revenue (2/14). The benefits relate to capability-
based value in terms of customer’s improved supply chain management and production 
planning which leads to operational performance-based value in terms of customer’s 
improved delivery accuracy, decreased unnecessary work or rush orders, reduced costs and 
improved competitiveness. The final outcome is the financial-based value in terms of 
customer’s improved profitability. 
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The interviewees usually do not believe in any sacrifices of supply transparency. However, 
three of the interviewees believe that if the customer shares inaccurate forecasts (3/14), it 
causes problems in supplier’s inventory management (3/14). This then leads to supplier’s 
increased costs (3/14) and finally decreases the whole supply chain’s competitiveness 
(3/14). These sacrifices destroy capability-based value (supplier’s decreased inventory 
management) which then destroys operational performance-based value in terms of 
increased costs for the supplier and decreased competitiveness for the whole supply chain. 
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Figure 16. Value-creating effects of organizational transparency. 
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Figure 16 above indicates the causal map of organizational transparency. It indicates that 
the transparent organizational information shared by both parties brings similar benefits and 
some sacrifices. The benefits usually relate to improved collaboration (9/14) that leads to 
decreased unnecessary work (6/14). Moreover, this leads to cost reductions (7/14) through 
efficiency or productivity improvements (7/14). Furthermore, some of the interviewees 
believe that when collaboration improves, it improves communication and causes cost 
reductions through improved delivery accuracy (3/14) and quality (3/14). Finally, cost 
reductions lead to improved competitiveness (4/14) and profitability (7/14) for both parties. 
These benefits relate to integration-based value in terms of improved collaboration and 
communication which then leads to operational performance-based value in terms of cost 
reductions and competitiveness for both parties. Lastly, financial-based value is created in 
terms of improved profitability for both parties. However, many interviewees pointed out 
that these operational- and financial-based value-creating effects of organizational 
transparency are quite marginal. 
 
The most usual sacrifice of organizational transparency for both parties is the situation 
where the decisions can be made at the wrong organizational level (4/14) causing increased 
suboptimization (4/14). Moreover, this leads to increased costs (5/14) and finally to 
decrease profitability (2/14). Furthermore, the interviewees believed that too much 
information (3/14) and the lack of appropriate resources (2/14) can lead to increased 
unnecessary work (3/14) and finally to increased costs. These negative effects especially 
destroy capability-based value (the decisions at the wrong organizational level, increased 
suboptimization) which then destroys operational performance-based value (increased 
costs) and finally financial-based value (decreased profitability). 
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Figure 17. Value-creating effects of technological transparency. 
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Figure 17 above demonstrates the causal map of technological transparency. It indicates 
that transparent technological information shared by the customer allows the supplier to 
participate in customer’s product development (8/14) that causes benefits but also some 
sacrifices. Sacrifices are believed to occur to the customer when it can have too high 
dependency on the supplier (3/14) causing customer’s increased costs (3/14) and finally 
decrease customer’s profitability (3/14). The benefits of supplier’s participation relate to 
supplier’s improved product development (7/14) that leads to improved technical 
characteristics of the products (5/14) and decreased costs (12/14) which both improve 
customer’s competitiveness (9/14). Many interviewees also believe that the benefits of 
supplier’s participation relate to the improved manufacturability of the products (7/14) that 
leads to decreased costs. Furthermore, the manufacturability of the products also improves 
through the customer’s ability to utilize supplier’s knowledge better (11/14) when the 
supplier shares technological information transparently. 
 
At first, the above mentioned benefits relate to integration-based value when the supplier 
has ability to participate in the customer’s product development and when the customer can 
utilize supplier’s knowledge better. This then leads to operational performance-based value 
in terms of improved manufacturability and technical characteristics of the products as well 
as decreased costs and improved competitiveness for the customer. However, the created 
integration-based value can be destroyed for the customer’s viewpoint if the dependency on 
the supplier is too high. Furthermore, this destroys operational performance-based value as 
customer’s costs increase and financial-based value as customer’s profitability decreases. 
 
Similarly like in the previous causal maps, the interviewees usually believe that when 
customer’s competitiveness improves, it also improves customer’s profitability (8/14) and 
increases the exchange with the supplier (10/14) through customer’s growing revenue 
(9/14). Exchange is also believed to increase when collaboration increases through 
increased collaboration (3/14) and increased trust (4/14) which are the results of supplier’s 
improved product development. Furthermore, the increased exchange leads to supplier’s 
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revenue growth (5/14) and finally to supplier’s improved profitability (10/14). These results 
relate to operational performance-based value (e.g. improved competitiveness) which then 
leads to financial-based value in terms of increased revenue and improved profitability. In 
addition, capability-based value is created when supplier’s product development improves 
which then leads to integration-based value in terms of increased trust, collaboration and 
the exchange with the supplier which then results financial-based value (growth revenue 
and improved profitability). 
 
The interviewees believe that technological transparency causes more often sacrifices to the 
customer rather than to the supplier. For example, eight of the interviewees believe that 
information can leak to the customer’s competitors whereas only four of the interviewees 
believe that the risks for information leak to the supplier’s competitors are significant. The 
causes of these are that the competitors can utilize the information (5/14) that leads to 
customer’s decreased competitiveness (4/14) and lastly customer’s decreased profitability 
(3/14). Similarly, the negative results for the supplier are supplier’s decreased 
competitiveness (4/14) and then decreased collaboration (2/14). These negative effects 
destroy integration-based value especially from the customer’s viewpoint when the 
information can leak to the customer’s competitors and the competitors can utilize the 
information which then destroys the operational performance-based value (customer’s 
decreased competitiveness) and finally financial-based value (decreased revenue and 
profitability for the customer). 
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Figure 18. Value-creating effects of strategic transparency. 
83 
 
Figure 18 above shows the causal map of strategic transparency. It indicates that 
transparent strategic information shared by the customer usually provides benefits such as 
improvements in the planning of supplier’s business strategy (10/14) which results in more 
customer-oriented investments by the supplier (7/14) and lastly leads to profitable growth 
for both parties (10/14). When supplier’s planning of business strategy improves, it is 
believed to help the planning of future collaboration (12/14). Similarly, when the supplier 
share strategic information transparently, it helps the planning of customer’s sourcing 
strategy (7/14) which then helps the planning of future collaboration. These benefits relate 
to capability-based value in terms of improved strategic planning for both parties which 
then leads to integration-based value (the planning of future collaboration). Moreover, the 
capability-based value is also created as the supplier can make more customer-oriented 
investments which lead to financial-based value in terms of profitable growth for both 
parties. 
 
The causal map indicates that improved planning of future collaboration usually causes 
positive effects such as profitable growth for both parties through increased collaboration 
(8/14). Some of the interviewees believe that improved planning of future collaboration 
leads to the decreased risks of customer’s bad sourcing decisions that improve cost 
effectiveness (4/14) and competitiveness (5/14) resulting in profitable growth. These 
realized benefits relate to integration-based value in terms of increased collaboration and 
customer’s decreased risks of bad sourcing decisions which then lead to financial-based 
value in terms of profitable growth for both parties. 
 
Some of the interviewees believe that the improved planning of the future collaboration can 
have negative effect on the supplier if the customer is not willing to continue the 
collaboration in the future (6/14) causing the end of the collaboration (3/14). However, the 
value-destroying effect that the customer is not willing to continue the collaboration is quite 
neutral (i.e. do not create or destroys value) because the interviewees usually do not believe 
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this for only as a negative sacrifice but rather beneficial for both so that the parties know 
faster if their strategies do not fit together. 
 
The causal map indicates that strategic transparency can cause sacrifices for both parties 
but only based on four interviewees’ beliefs. The sacrifices relate to the leakage of 
information to the competitors or wrong parties (4/14) causing the situation where the 
competitors can utilize the information (2/14) that leads to decreased competitiveness 
(3/14) and lastly decreased revenue (2/14) and profitability (2/14) for the customer and/or 
the customer. These negative effects destroy integration-based value when the information 
can leak to the competitors or wrong parties. This then destroys operational performance-
based value (decreased competitiveness) and then financial-based value in terms of 
decreased revenue and profitability. 
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Figure 19. Value-creating effects of transparency. 
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Figure 19 above presents the causal map where different transparency types are combined. 
It indicates that most often the interviewees believe that the benefits of transparency relate 
to cost reductions. They usually believe that this happens especially when transparency 
improves collaboration which then decreases unnecessary work or rush deliveries. 
Transparency also improves supplier’s production planning which leads to supplier’s 
improved delivery accuracy as well as improves customer’s supply chain management 
which leads to customer’s improved delivery accuracy. Both of these improvements lead to 
decreased unnecessary work or rush deliveries and then cost reductions. Moreover, the 
supplier can participate in customer’s product development that improve the 
manufacturability of the product and supplier’s product development which both lead to 
cost reductions. Transparency also helps the customer to utilize supplier’s knowledge better 
which decreases costs. These benefits relate to integration-based value in terms of 
improved collaboration as well as supplier’s ability to participate in customer’s product 
development and customer’s ability to utilize supplier’s knowledge better. Capability-based 
value is created when supplier’s production planning and customer’s supply chain 
management improve as well as when supplier’s product development improves. These 
capability-based and integration-based value factors then lead to operational performance-
based value such as improved manufacturability of the product, decreased unnecessary 
work or rush deliveries and especially cost reductions. 
 
The cost reductions are usually believed to cause improved competitiveness and 
profitability for both parties. For example, customer’s profitability is believed to improve 
through the declining price of supplier’s product. Furthermore, customer’s improved 
competitiveness is believed to grow customer’s revenue that leads to customer’s improved 
profitability but also the increased exchange with the supplier. Increased exchange is 
believed to grow supplier’s revenue that leads to supplier’s improved profitability. These 
benefits relate to operational performance-based value in terms of improved 
competitiveness and the declined price of supplier’s product which then leads to financial-
based value in terms of revenue growth and improved profitability. 
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The causal map also reveals that transparency brings strategic benefits when the customer 
share strategic information transparently that helps the planning of supplier’s business 
strategy resulting in supplier’s better ability to make customer-oriented investments. This is 
believed to cause profitable growth for both parties. The improved planning of supplier’s 
business strategy is also believed to improve the planning of future collaboration. The 
improved planning of future collaboration leads to increased collaboration that also causes 
profitable growth for both parties. Collaboration is also believed to be increased through 
increased trust. These benefits relate to capability-based value in terms of improved 
strategic planning for both parties which then leads to integration-based value related to the 
improved planning of future collaboration as well as increased trust and collaboration. In 
addition, the capability-based value is created when the supplier can make more customer-
oriented investments. Lastly, these value factors lead to financial-based value in terms of 
profitable growth for both parties. 
 
The causal map also reveals that transparency causes sacrifices for both parties. Usually, 
the interviewees believe that the information leakages to the competitors cause the situation 
where the competitors can utilize the information leading to decreased competitiveness that 
then decreased revenue and finally decreased profitability. This kind of sacrifice is believed 
to happen more often for the supplier than the customer in general. These negative effects 
destroy integration-based value when the information can leak to the competitors which 
then destroy the operational performance-based value when competitiveness decreases. 
Finally, financial-based value is destroyed when revenue and profitability decrease.  
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5 DISCUSSION AND DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTIONS 
This chapter provides the interpretations of the results presented in the previous result 
chapter by following the order of the research questions. It also presents the framework for 
value co-creation and value capture through relationship transparency and provides the 
development suggestions for the appropriate level of transparency. 
5.1 Level of transparency in the supply network 
The results for the first research question (What is the level of transparency in the supply 
network?) indicated that the customer had slightly higher transparency with contract 
manufacturers than with the other supplier groups. The reason for that can be that when the 
contract manufacturers provide the components and / or sub-assemblies with the 
collaborative long-term relationship, the suppliers see the customer as one of the most 
important customers for them. Therefore the suppliers are more willing to share 
information transparently. Respectively, the customer is more willing to share information 
transparently with these suppliers because these suppliers are strategically important 
partners and provide the highest amount of customer’s annual purchasing volume (69 %). 
Respectively, transparency with subcontractors who provide basic machined metal 
components was usually at the lowest level. This indicates that these relationships are not 
seen as the most important by the customer. Usually, the customer assessed transparency at 
slightly higher level than the suppliers. This can be the results of customer’s more powerful 
position over these two supplier groups forcing them to share more information. 
Transparency with the technology suppliers was usually between these other two supplier 
groups and the suppliers assessed transparency higher than the customer. That can be 
explained by technology suppliers’ lack of interest and higher power position over the 
customer. These suppliers are mostly the part of the big global organization that provides 
their own high-tech components which has high switching costs in customer’s end products 
causing the high level of dependency for the customer. It can be assumed that these 
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suppliers believe to keep the customer without allocating high amount of resources for the 
relationship. 
 
The results also revealed that organizational transparency was at the highest level whereas 
cost transparency was at the lowest level in the supply network. The high level of 
organizational transparency can be explained by a small size of the suppliers whose 
organizations are easier to communicate to the customer. Furthermore, the customer 
assessment of the transparency of technology supplier’s organization was also at the high 
level. This indicates that these big global organizations’ organizational structures have been 
well developed which helps the information sharing. Usually, these suppliers assessed the 
transparency on customer’s organization at much lower level that indicates the lack of 
clarification for customer’s organizational structure and/or lack of information sharing 
about customer’s organization and processes. Cost transparency was at the low level in 
each supplier groups and there seems to be lots of improvement opportunities. Furthermore, 
the results revealed that the customer had very limited information especially on technology 
suppliers’ costs which can be the result of technology suppliers’ lack of interest and higher 
power over the customer. 
 
Supply, technological and strategic transparencies were all at moderate level. The highest 
was technological transparency, after that followed supply transparency and the lowest was 
strategic transparency. However, the level of these transparency types did not vary 
significantly between the supplier groups and it mostly followed the order where the 
contract manufacturers have the highest and the subcontractors have the lowest level of 
transparency. The order between supply and technological transparencies indicates that 
supply transparency is at the relative low level in the supply network as supply 
transparency can be assumed to be the higher because of its operative nature. For example, 
products can be delivered with fully transparent information sharing about the supply 
activities without any information sharing related to product development (i.e. 
technological transparency) or strategic issues (i.e. strategic transparency). Respectively, 
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when technological transparency is at high level with increased product development it can 
be expected that it requires more strategic discussions (i.e. strategic transparency) and 
eventually more strategic relationship. Therefore, strategic transparency seems to be at the 
appropriate level related to technological transparency in the supply network.  
5.2 Antecedents for transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships 
The results for the second research question (What are the antecedents for transparency in 
the buyer-supplier relationships?) indicated that transparency requires relationship 
integration with relational capital and relationship structures dimensions but not with 
relationship-specific investments dimension that previously have been argued to be an 
important antecedent for transparency (Walter 2003: 728; Johnsen 2009: 193; Frazier et al. 
2009: 38–40; Möller et al. 2012: 126–129). The need for relationship capital related to the 
interviewees’ beliefs that transparency requires trust between the parties. Trust is part of 
relational capital that is a form of social capital and which also contains open interaction 
and community as Kohtamäki et al. (2012: 1300) demonstrates. This finding is also 
supported by the previous empirical studies which presents that trust is the most important 
antecedent for transparency (Lamming et al. 2001: 6; Walter 2003: 728; Hultman & 
Axelsson 2007: 634; Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Akkermans et al. 2004: 448; Barratt & 
Oke 2007: 524; Squire et al. 2009: 472; Klein & Rai 2009: 38; Frazier et al. 2009: 749; Lee 
et al. 2014: 290). The interviewees usually believed that the contracts which secure the 
information sharing, successful long-term collaboration and transparent organizational 
cultures precede trust. It indicates that companies should focus on these three things in 
order to increase trust which then helps to increase transparency in the relationship. 
 
The need for relationship structures related to the interviewees’ beliefs that transparency 
usually requires the arranged methods and IT-systems for information sharing, regular 
strategic discussions and appropriate human resources for information sharing. These can 
be seen as part of relationship structures which are IT systems and organizational routines 
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which enhance interaction between the parties (e.g. development teams, relationship 
steering group, shared process descriptions and integrated IT systems) (Kohtamäki et al. 
2012: 1300–1301). For example, the IT-systems for information sharing refer to the 
integrated IT systems. The information technology has also been presented to be an 
important antecedent for relationship transparency in previous studies (e.g. Hultman & 
Axelsson 2007: 634; Caglio & Ditillo 2012: 69). Furthermore, the IT systems for 
information sharing can be seen to precede the arranged methods for information sharing so 
that these arranged methods determine how to use these IT systems for information sharing 
in the relationship. Regular strategic discussions refer to the discussions made by the 
relationship steering group that manages the activities for relationship development. Lastly, 
appropriate human resources for information sharing relate to companies internal resources 
which are needed to form these kind of relational structures. It can also be seen to precede 
the arranged methods for information sharing, IT-systems and regular strategic discussions 
because these are not possible if companies do not have enough appropriate resources. 
Therefore, transparency needs allocated resources which costs have to be taken into 
account when increasing transparency. 
 
The results also indicated that different types of transparency have different antecedents. 
For example, the interviewees believed that supply and organizational transparencies 
usually require the arranged methods and IT-systems for information sharing whereas trust 
was not seen as often the important antecedents for transparency. Therefore, the 
relationships should be integrated in a way that at least the relationship structures are at the 
high level. Respectively, the interviewees believed that especially cost, technological and 
strategic transparencies require trust. Moreover, cost transparency required a cost 
accounting system whereas strategic transparency required regular strategic discussions and 
concrete strategies for both parties. Furthermore, some of the interviewees believed that 
these transparency types require appropriate resources and arranged methods for 
information sharing. Therefore, these transparency types require the relationships where 
both the relational capital and the relationship structures are at the high level.  
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The costs of different transparency types can be lower for organizational transparency 
because it was mainly believed to require only the arranged methods for information 
sharing. Moreover, the costs of technological transparency can also be quite low because it 
was usually believed to require trust and the arranged methods for product development. 
However, cost and supply transparencies can cause significant costs if the IT-systems or 
cost accounting systems require the high amount of integration. In addition, strategic 
transparency can cause higher costs because it was believed to require managers’ valuable 
time to conduct regular strategic discussion. Lastly, cost, technological and strategic 
transparencies can be more difficult to achieve because these were believed to require more 
integrated relationship and especially trust which can take more time to build. 
5.3 Value-creating effects of transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships 
The results for the third research question (How can transparency have effects on value co-
creation in the buyer-supplier relationships?) indicated that transparency usually creates 
more benefits than sacrifices and therefore transparency enhances value co-creation in the 
buyer-supplier relationships. These results support the previous researches as they have 
demonstrated that transparency can bring many benefits but also has some sacrifices (eg. 
Eggert & Helm 2003: 106–107; Hultman & Axelsson 2007: 629–634). However, this 
research demonstrated the causal beliefs about how the value-creating effects of 
transparency occur for both parties in the buyer-supplier relationship. 
 
Following with the Terpend et al. (2008: 40.) categorization of relationship value, usually 
the value-creating effects of transparency related to operational performance-based value 
factors in terms of cost reductions and improved delivery accuracy for both parties. 
Furthermore, integration-based value factors were also common and these relate to 
improved collaboration that leads to decreased unnecessary work and rush deliveries. 
Finally, these were believed to lead to cost reductions. Moreover, transparency was also 
believed to allow the supplier to participate in customer’s product development that leads to 
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cost reductions. These findings support the previous empirical studies of transparency as 
they indicate that transparency increases customer’s perceived value (Eggert & Helm 2003: 
106–107.) and helps the creation of valuable offering and eliminate waste (i.e. non-value 
adding activities) (Lamming et al. 2005: 558–561) as well as provides costs reductions in 
products and manufacturing processes (Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Suomala et al. 2010: 
87–88, Agndal & Nilsson’s 2010: 158; Alenius et al. 2015: 204).  
 
The results also indicated that usually integration-based value factors preceded the 
operational based value factors as Figure 20 below demonstrate. Similarly with integration-
based value factors, capability-based value factors were believed to precede operational 
performance-based value factors. For example, customer’s and supplier’s delivery 
accuracies and costs reduce when supplier’s production planning, supplier’s resource usage 
and customer’s supply chain management improve. Similarly, Hultman and Axelsson 
(2007: 633–634) argue that transparency helps to solve problems in the flows of materials 
and product development.  
 
The results clearly indicated that operational performance-based value leads to financial-
based value. For example, cost reductions improve customer’s and supplier’s profitability 
whereas competitiveness improves customer’s revenue that was usually believed to 
improve the exchange with the supplier and then to improve supplier’s revenue and 
profitability. The exchange with the supplier also increases when the collaboration 
increases through trust and the improved planning of future collaboration which all relate to 
integration-based value. These findings are supported by Das et al. (2006: 572–573) as they 
argue that improved manufacturing performance (cost reductions, improved quality and 
shorter lead times) leads to improved financial performance (improved profit and growth in 
market and sales). 
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Operational Performance-based Value:
+ Costs reduce (CS37)
+ Competitiveness improves (C31/S17)
+ Unnecessary work/rush orders decrease (CS22)
+ Delivery accuracy improves (C15/S19)
+ The price of supplier’s product declines (C9)
- Competitiveness decreases (C8/S13)
Integration-based Value:
+ Collaboration improves (CS30)
+ The exchange with the supplier increases (S20)
+ The planning of future collaboration improves 
(CS12)
+ The customer can utilize supplier’s knowledge 
better (C11)
+ The supplier can participate in customer’s 
product development (CS8)
+ Trust increases (CS9)
+ Collaboration increases (CS13)
- Information can leak to competitors (C10/S13)
- The competitors can utilize information (C8/S5)
TRANSPARENCY
Financial-based Value:
+ Profitabilty improves (C31/S33)
+ Revenue grows (C14/S11)
+ Profitable growth for both (CS10)
- Revenue decreases (C6/S7)
- Profitability decreases (C5/S7)
CO-CREATED VALUE THROUGH TRANSPARENCY
Capability-based Value:
+ Supplier’s production planning improves (S13)
+ The planning of supplier’s business strategy 
improves (S10)
+ Customer’s supply chain mgmt. improves (C9)
+ Supplier’s resource usage improves (S8)
+ Supplier’s product development improves (S7)
+ The supplier can make more customer oriented 
investment (CS7)
C = The effect for the customer
S = The effect for the supplier
CS = The effect for both parties
Number = How many times the 
effect occur in the causal maps
 
Figure 20. Co-created value through transparency in buyer-supplier relationships. 
 
The results also indicated that the sacrifices (i.e. risks) for transparency usually relate to 
information leakages to competitors where the leakages for the supplier’s competitors were 
believed to be more common. This usually leads to decreased competitiveness when the 
competitors are able to utilize the leaked information for their benefit. Lastly, decreased 
competitiveness leads to decreased revenue and profitability which was usually believed to 
occur more often for the supplier than for the customer. Similarly with these findings, 
previous researches argue that transparency causes the risks of information leakages to the 
competitors or it can be misused for the receiver’s own good (Lamming et al. 2005: 558–
561; Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Suomala et al. 2010: 91–93). 
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Table 16. Comparing the value-creating effects of different transparency types. 
 
Capability-based Integration-based
Operational 
Performance-based
Financial-based
Supplier’s costs awareness 
improves (+S6)
Collaboration for cost reductions 
improves (+CS11)
Total costs reduce (+CS12)
Profitability improves 
(+C8/+S8)
Supplier's weak efficiency 
can be revealed (-S4)
Deliveries can go to supplier's 
competitors (-S6)
Competitiveness improves 
(+C8/+S4)
The benefits of cost 
reductions can be shared 
evenly (+CS5)
Information can leak to competitors 
(-C2/-S5)
The price of supplier’s 
product declines (+C5)
Revenue grows 
(+C3/+S4)
Profitability decreases             
(-C2/-S5)
Revenue decreases              
(-C1/-S5)
Customer’s supply chain 
mgmt. improves (+C9)
Delivery accuracy improves 
(+C9/+S13)
Profitability improves 
(+C8/+S8)
Supplier’s resource usage 
improves (+S8)
Costs reduce (+C9/+S7)
Production planning 
improves (+C4/+S13)
Unnecessary work/rush 
orders decrease (+CS5)
Competitiveness improves 
(+C5/+S4)
The price of supplier’s 
product declines (+C4)
The decisions can be made 
at the wrong level (-CS4)
Collaboration increases (+CS9) Costs reduce (+CS7)
Profitability improves 
(+CS7)
Suboptimization increases       
(-CS4)
Communication improves (+CS5)
Efficiency/productivity 
improves (+CS7)
Unnecessary work 
decreases (+CS6)
Competitiveness improves 
(+CS4)
Costs increase (-CS5)
Supplier’s product 
development improves (+S7)
The customer can utilize supplier’s 
knowledge better (+C11)
Costs reduce (+CS12)
Profitability improves 
(+C8/+S10)
The exchange with the supplier 
increases (+S10)
Competitiveness improves 
(+C9)
Revenue grows 
(+C9/+S5)
The supplier can participate in 
customer’s product development 
(+S8)
The manufacturability of the 
products improve (+CS7)
Trust increases (+CS4)
Technical characteristics of 
the products improve (+CS5)
Information can leak to competitors 
(-C8/-S4)
Competitiveness decreases        
(-C4/-S4)
The customer's competitors can 
utilize information (-C8)
The planning of supplier’s 
business strategy improves 
(+S10)
The planning of future collaboration 
improves (+CS12)
Competitiveness improves 
(+CS5)
Both parties can grow 
profitably (+CS10)
The supplier can make more 
customer oriented 
investment (+CS7)
Collaboration increases (+CS8)
Cost effectiveness improves 
(+CS4)
The planning of customer’s 
sourcing strategy improves 
(+C7)
Customer's risks of bad sourcing 
decisions declines (+C4)
The customer is not willing to 
continue the collaboration (-S6)
Information can leak to competitors 
(-CS4)
C = The effect for the customer, S = The effect for the supplier, CS = The effect for both parties,                                                                                                                 
Number = How many times the effect occur in the causal maps
Cost 
Transparency
Supply 
Transparency
Organizational 
Transparency
Technological 
Transparency
Strategic 
Transparency
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The results also indicated that different types of transparency had different value-creating 
effects as Table 16 above demonstrates. For example, the value-creating effects of all the 
other transparency types except supply transparency related to integration-based value. 
Moreover, supply transparency had only the positive value-creating effects without 
significant value-destroying effects such as risks. Therefore, supply transparency seems to 
be suitable also in the transactional relationships without the aims to increase collaboration 
and transparency in other areas. For example, the parties can improve their capabilities and 
operational performance by sharing transparent supply information during delivering the 
standardized product as efficiently as possible. However, this situation limits the value 
creation possibilities in the buyer-supplier relationships because it does not enhance 
integration-based value as other transparency types.  
 
When the parties try to co-create value as much as possible in the buyer-supplier 
relationships, they have to aim for more collaborative relationships and use all five 
transparency types in a balanced way. The balanced way means that the negative effects 
such as the risks of transparency should be balanced in the relationship so that the benefits 
of transparency exceed its sacrifices for both parties’ viewpoints. This suggestion is in line 
with the Eggert & Helm (2003: 103) and Hultman & Axelsson (2007: 634) which have 
proposed that transparency needs to be balanced rather than maximized in different buyer-
supplier relationships. Table 16 indicates that the value-destroying effects were believed to 
happen more often to the supplier than to the customer in cost transparency whereas 
technological transparency caused the risks to the customer rather than to the supplier. 
Therefore, the level of transparency should be balanced in a way that the supplier provides 
transparent information on its costs whereas the customer should provide transparent 
information on its technology in order to share the risks of transparency and co-create value 
as much as possible. Lastly, companies should allocate their limited resources to only a few 
collaborative and strategic relationships and try to increase the level of transparency in the 
most important relationships because transparency requires allocated resources and causes 
costs. 
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5.4 Development suggestions 
This chapter describes the framework for value co-creation and value capture through 
relationship transparency. It also provides the development suggestions for the appropriate 
level of transparency in the supply network with using the framework. The framework in 
Figure 21 below is based on the assumption that the levels of the transparency types should 
vary slightly in order to get a balance because each type of transparency has unique 
requirements as well as value-creating and value-destroying effects which need to take into 
account. 
 
V
A
L
U
E
 C
O
-C
R
E
A
T
IO
N
 P
O
T
E
N
T
IA
L
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
5
4
3
2
1
5
4
3
2
1
SUPPLY NETWORK (24 RELATIONSHIPS)
Standard deviation = Mean = Target (Mean)=
5
SUPPLY 
TRANSPARENCY
TECHNOLOGICAL
TRANSPARENCY
ORGANIZATIONAL 
TRANSPARENCY
STRATEGIC
TRANSPARENCY
COST / PRICE 
TRANSPARENCY
4
3
2
1
5
VALUE 
CAPTURE
 
Figure 21. Framework for value co-creation and value capture through relationship 
transparency. 
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At first, cost transparency in the framework can be understood as an important factor for a 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationship and it closely relates to technological and strategic 
transparency. For example, cost transparency is needed for having cost reductions through 
product development collaboration (e.g. calculating the cost reductions between the old and 
the new solutions) or when the supplier makes customer specific investments (e.g. take into 
account the costs of new investment in the price negotiations). Moreover, cost transparency 
was believed to help sharing the benefits of cost reduction activities evenly (i.e. capture 
value) so that both parties’ profitability improves. Therefore, cost transparency can 
determine the level that other transparency types should follow in order to co-create value 
and share it fairly. Supply transparency was usually believed to lead only to benefits. 
Therefore, it can be understood as the basic transparency type so that all buyer-supplier 
relationships should have the highest level of supply transparency as possible. However, it 
can cause significant costs if the IT-systems require the high amount of integration. 
Therefore, its costs should be taken into account when trying to increase its level. 
 
Organizational and technological transparencies can be understood to relate to each other. 
For example, organizational transparency allows customer’s and suppliers’ representatives 
communication between different organizational levels in order to enhance product 
development. Therefore, if the supplier does not participate in customer’s product 
development extensively, then the lower level of technological and organizational 
transparency is appropriate. Moreover, it can be assumed that the high level of 
organizational transparency is needed when the strategic transparency increases (i.e. more 
information on other parties’ business processes for the help of strategic discussions).  
 
Lastly, strategic transparency can be at the very high level only with the limited number of 
suppliers as it requires managers’ valuable time to conduct regular strategic discussions.  
Therefore, strategic transparency starts from the higher level than other transparency types 
because there can be many transactional relationships without strategic discussions (i.e. 
strategic transparency) which still performs at the excellent level. For example, the 
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suppliers who deliver standard components with the excellent delivery accuracy require 
mostly the high level of supply transparency.  
 
The current and target levels of transparency in Figure 21 demonstrate that cost 
transparency in the supply network seems to be the area which needs the most improvement 
efforts in order to decrease its gap for other transparency types. This usually requires trust 
but also the contracts that secure the information sharing and transparent organizational 
culture which both preceded trust. Furthermore, cost accounting systems and clear cost 
calculation methods have to be built which cause costs. Therefore, cost transparency is not 
appropriate or even possible to be at the very high level in every relationship and it should 
vary based on the importance of the relationship to both parties. For example, it is 
important to determine which products’ or sub-assemblies’ costs structures are the most 
beneficial to open (e.g. the items with the low change rate and high volume) and with 
whom suppliers (e.g. the strategic suppliers with the high amount of purchasing volume).  
 
Another improvement area in the supply network is supply transparency. Previously supply 
transparency has been the main development area and the results from the questionnaire 
were a bit surprising as it was assessed to be only at the moderate level. For example, the 
supply network has used the web-based supply chain collaboration platform with the 
customer’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) -integration for the orders. However, the 
interviews with supplier representatives revealed that the reason for the moderate level of 
supply transparency relates to the useless forecasts shared by the customer (e.g. forecasts 
were not provided at the component level). However, customer’s representatives 
demonstrated that the supplier has the possibility to transfer the forecast to the component 
level by using the specific spreadsheet that has been delivered to all suppliers. It seems that 
supplier’s representatives have not been informed enough about this possibility. Therefore, 
customer’s representatives should provide more information for the suppliers about how to 
use the forecast appropriately. Another option is to automatize the spreadsheet so that the 
suppliers can get the component level forecasts easier and faster from the weekly forecast. 
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Organizational transparency is at the highest level in the supply network and it seems to be 
suitable for the higher levels of technological and strategic transparencies. Technological 
and strategic transparencies have to be slightly improved in order to enhance value co-
creation. However, the target levels of these transparency types should vary based on the 
supplier types (i.e. contract manufacturers, technology suppliers and subcontractors). 
5.4.1 Appropriate level of transparency with the contract manufacturers 
Figure 22 below presents the current and target levels of transparency with the contract 
manufacturers. Overall the transparency with the contract manufacturers should be at the 
highest level because these suppliers provide the highest amount of customer’s annual 
purchasing volume (69 %) and therefore can have the biggest effects on value co-creation 
in the supply network. The transparency can vary a bit between the suppliers but at least the 
mean level should be increased to the level presented in Figure 22 below. 
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Figure 22. Appropriate level of transparency with contract manufacturers. 
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The biggest gap relates to cost transparency where especially the suppliers should provide 
more transparent information on their costs. For example, they should build the cost 
accounting systems and determine cost calculation methods with the customer. 
Respectively, the customer should provide more transparent information on its technology 
as well as its strategy and organization. For example, it could increase product development 
collaboration, have more strategic discussions and share more information about its 
purchasing organization with these suppliers. Moreover, both parties should provide as 
transparent supply information as possible. This requires especially IT-systems’ integration 
but also the arranged methods for information sharing. For example, it is important to share 
the information and knowledge about how the parties can use the forecasts and web-based 
collaborative platform more effectively. The highest levels of cost, technological and 
strategic transparencies can be more appropriate with the contracts manufacturers than with 
the other suppliers. The reason for this is that these transparency types are the most difficult 
to achieve because these require more integrated relationship and especially trust which can 
be assumed to already developed at the high level during successful long-term 
collaboration.  
5.4.2 Appropriate level of transparency with the technology suppliers 
Figure 23 below demonstrated the current and target levels of transparency with the 
technology suppliers. Overall the transparency with the technology supplier should be at 
the high level but not as high as with the contracts manufacturers. The bigger size and 
power of these suppliers can slower the development of transparency. Therefore, the target 
level could be a slightly lower. 
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Figure 23. Appropriate level of transparency with technology suppliers. 
 
Similar than with the contract manufacturers, the biggest gap relates to cost transparency 
where especially the suppliers should provide more transparent information on their costs. 
The development of cost transparency can be difficult as these suppliers are usually big 
global organizations and the customer is not very important for them. However, a good way 
could be to begin sharing of cost information that allows the comparisons between the old 
and the new mutually developed technological solution. This way cost transparency helps 
capturing the co-created value so that the benefits of the development can be shared 
precisely and fairly between the parties.  
 
In the other transparency types, the customer usually shares more information and therefore 
technology suppliers should provide more information especially related to supply, 
technology and strategy for decreasing the gap to the target level. At first, the 
improvements should concentrate mostly on supply transparency so that the customer 
receives more transparent information on supplier’s supply activities (e.g. order tracking). 
Moreover, the supplier should share more technical information when sharing costs 
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information on its new technological solutions in order to demonstrate the reasons for cost 
reductions. Respectively, customer’s representatives should provide more supply 
information for the suppliers about how to use the forecast appropriately in order to reach 
the target level. In addition, the customer should provide more information on its 
organization and for example clarify its organizational structure for these suppliers. In the 
future, there are better possibilities to begin the strategic discussions about the more intense 
and transparent product development with these big global organizations so that the gap of 
strategic transparency decreases. 
5.4.3 Appropriate level of transparency with the subcontractors 
Figure 24 below presents the current and target levels of transparency with the 
subcontractors. Overall the transparency with the subcontractors should be at the moderate 
level and slightly lower than with the other supplier groups because these relationships are 
not as important or strategic to the customer as with the relationship with other suppliers. 
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Figure 24. Appropriate level of transparency with subcontractors. 
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Similar with the other supplier groups, the biggest gap relates to cost transparency where 
the suppliers should slightly provide more information on their costs than the customer. It is 
very important to determine which products’ cost structures are the most beneficial to open 
because these suppliers have the most transactional relationships and they usually compete 
of the customer’s orders with each other. Furthermore, supply transparency requires major 
improvements from both ways. For example, the suppliers should provide more 
information of their capacity and allow the tracking of the orders from their processes 
whereas customer’s representatives should ensure that the forecasts are shared and used 
appropriately.  
 
Compared with the other supplier groups, the customer clearly shares more information 
with the other two supplier groups especially related to technology and strategy. It can be 
assumed that the type of exchange naturally limits the amount of technology and strategic 
transparency in the subcontractor group because these suppliers provide only standard 
machined components with limited amount of product development by the supplier. 
However, there is also a possibility to increase collaboration and the type of exchange (e.g. 
more demanding components or sub-assemblies) with some of these suppliers so that they 
move into the contract manufacturer group where the higher transparency is appropriate. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this research was to make the development suggestions for the 
appropriate level of transparency in different buyer-supplier relationships in the supply 
network so that more value can be created and shared between the actors. Based on that 
main objective, the research problem was defined as follows: What is the appropriate level 
of transparency in different buyer-supplier relationships in order to enhance value co-
creation in the supply network? The research problem was approached with three research 
questions concerning the level of transparency in the supply network, the antecedents for 
transparency in the buyer-supplier relationships and the effects of transparency on value co-
creation in the buyer-supplier relationships.   
 
The results for the first research question indicated that the level of transparency in the 
supply network varied based on the type of the relationship where the more collaborative 
relationships had the higher level of transparency. Moreover, the more powerful actor 
seemed to force the other to share more information. The research results also revealed that 
organizational transparency was at the highest level whereas cost transparency was at the 
lowest level in the supply network. Supply, technological and strategic transparencies were 
all at moderate level. The highest of these was technological transparency, followed by 
supply and strategic transparencies. 
 
The results for the second research question indicated that the antecedents for transparency 
related to the arranged methods and the IT-systems for information sharing as well as 
appropriate human resources for information sharing and regular strategic discussions. The 
IT systems for information sharing could be understood to precede the arranged methods 
for information sharing so that these arranged methods determine how to use these IT 
systems effectively. All these requirements need allocated resources and therefore cause 
costs. Transparency also required trust between the parties where the contracts that secure 
the information sharing, the successful long-term collaboration and transparent 
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organizational cultures were believed to precede trust. These results supported the previous 
studies which have argued that information technology and trust are the most important 
antecedents (e.g. Hultman & Axelsson 2007: 634) but not the argument that relationship-
specific investments are an important antecedent (e.g. Walter 2003: 728). The results also 
indicated that different types of transparency have different antecedents. For example, 
supply and organizational transparencies were not believed to require trust as often as cost, 
technological and strategic transparencies. 
 
The results for the third research question indicated that transparency enhances value co-
creation in the buyer-supplier relationships as it creates more benefits than sacrifices. The 
previous studies have argued that transparency increases customer’s perceived value based 
on the quantitative study (Eggert & Helm 2003: 106–107.) whereas the findings of this 
qualitative study demonstrated the causal beliefs related to the value-creating effects of 
transparency on both parties. The results revealed that usually the value-creating effects of 
transparency related to integration-based value such as improved collaboration. 
Transparency also helped to create capability-based value such as supplier’s improved 
production planning and customer’s improved supply chain management. These findings 
supported the previous studies as they have indicated that transparency helps the creation of 
valuable offering and eliminates waste (Lamming et al. 2005: 558–561) as well as helps to 
solve problems in the material flow and product development (Hultman & Axelsson 2007: 
633–634). Integration and capability-based value factors usually led to operational 
performance-based value such as cost reductions and improved delivery accuracy for both 
parties. Similarly, previous empirical studies have revealed that transparency leads to costs 
reductions in products and manufacturing processes (e.g. Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200). 
Finally, operational performance-based value was believed to lead to financial-based value. 
 
The results also revealed that different types of transparency have different value-creating 
effects. For example, the value-creating effects of all the other transparency types except 
supply transparency related to integration-based value. Moreover, only supply transparency 
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had mainly the positive value-creating effects without significant value-destroying effects 
such as risks about information leakages to competitors. The findings about the negative 
effects of transparency have also been supported by the previous studies (e.g. Lamming et 
al. 2005: 558–561; Kajüter & Kulmala 2005: 200; Suomala et al. 2010: 91–93). Lastly, 
when the parties try to co-create value as much as possible in the buyer-supplier 
relationships, they have to aim for more collaborative relationships and use all five 
transparency types in a balanced way where both parties have the similar amount of risks. 
 
In order to solve the research problem, the framework for value co-creation and value 
capture through relationship transparency was created. The framework helps managers to 
find the appropriate level of transparency in different buyer-supplier relationships where 
the risks of transparency are balanced and the target levels of different transparency types 
are determined in order to create and share more value between the actors. Also the type of 
the relationship has to be taken into account because the high level of transparency is not 
appropriate in all relationships as transparency causes costs. For the managerial purposes, 
the current and target levels of transparency were presented in the framework for three 
different supplier groups with the specific development suggestions. Moreover, the current 
and target levels of transparency will be provided for the 24 most important relationships so 
that the parties can begin to increase the transparency and reach the supplier group’s target 
levels. In the future, it is important to assess the actual financial impacts of increased 
transparency in these relationships. This could be also an interesting area for further 
research. The framework is applicable at least to similar supply networks which provide 
low volume manufactured products with many different and variable items. However, there 
is a need for further research in order to broaden the applicability of the framework. The 
applicability of the framework should be tested in the supply network which has higher 
volume and more standardized products without many different and variable items. 
 
Limitations of this research mainly concern the single case study research method that 
concentrates only on the specific phenomenon that is hard to generalize from a single case 
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to the wider population. Therefore there is a demand for further research. One area is the 
antecedents of transparency where quantitative study with the large number of respondents 
could provide support for the results of this qualitative study. For example, the quantitative 
study could relate to the relationship between transparency and relationship integration or 
the relationships between transparency and value creation. Another area relates to the 
transparency between the suppliers in the supply network. For this topic, there could be a 
study related to value-creating effects of transparency within the triads which are closely 
linked together in order to provide the bigger solution for the customer. Furthermore, the 
level of competition in the supply network and its effects on transparency could be 
interesting area for further research.  
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APPENDIX 2 Questionnaire for the supplier 
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APPENDIX 3 Interview guide 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Semi-structured interview questions for the customer and the suppliers 
 
After each specific starting question, the interviewer uses a series of directed probing 
questions such as what it causes, where it leads, what it effects and why until the 
interviewee cannot give any more answers. The aim is to get a number of cause-effect 
chains of varying length which represents the value-creating effects of transparency (i.e. 
benefits versus sacrifices) as well as the requirements for transparency. Lastly, the 
graphical causal maps are formed during the interview and these are sent to the interviewee 
for review and possible modifications after the transcription. All interviews are recorded if 
the interviewee gives the permit. 
COST TRANSPARENCY 
A customer can share cost information related to the market prices of purchased products 
and services, the development of customer's production costs, the development of 
purchasing prices in the supply network and customer's profitability development based on 
the financial data, for instance. 
1. What are the effects if a customer shares cost information transparently? 
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A supplier can share cost information related to supplier's purchasing prices and supplier's 
direct production costs, for instance. 
2. What are the effects if a supplier shares cost information transparently? 
 
3. What are the requirements for sharing cost information transparently? 
 
SUPPLY TRANSPARENCY 
A customer can share supply information related to the activity of customers / demand 
based on the offers, production / delivery forecasts based on the orders and customer's 
warehouse level of the components, for instance. 
4. What are the effects if a customer shares supply information transparently? 
A supplier can share supply information related to supplier's production capacity, supplier's 
buffer stock levels, order tracking in supplier's processes and information about supplier's 
purchasing sources, for instance. 
5. What are the effects if a supplier shares supply information transparently? 
 
6. What are the requirements for sharing supply information transparently? 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSPARENCY 
 
A customer can share organizational information related to information about who knows 
what and who are responsible for things in the customer's organization, information about 
changes in customer's organization as well as information about customer's business 
processes and working practices, for instance. 
7. What are the effects if a customer shares organizational information 
transparently? 
A supplier can share information related to information about who knows what and who are 
responsible for things in the supplier's organization, information about changes in supplier's 
organization as well as information about supplier's business processes and working 
practices, for instance. 
8. What are the effects if a supplier shares organizational information 
transparently? 
 
9. What are the requirements for sharing organizational information transparently? 
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TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSPARENCY 
 
A customer can share technological information related to information about the current 
features of customer's products, information about the new and planned features of 
customer's products and information about coming changes for the products, for instance. 
10. What are the effects if a customer shares technological information 
transparently? 
A supplier can share technological information related to information about the features of 
supplier's products, information about the changes of raw material or components by the 
supplier, information about supplier's production technologies and information about the 
ways how a supplier could bring benefits to customer’s product development, for instance. 
11. What are the effects if a supplier shares technological information transparently? 
 
12. What are the requirements for sharing technological information transparently? 
 
STRATEGIC TRANSPARENCY 
 
A customer can share strategic information related to information about customer's current 
business strategy, information about customer's competitive advantage, information about 
the future directions of customer's business strategy and information about customer's 
current purchasing politics, for instance. 
13. What are the effects if a customer shares strategic information transparently? 
A supplier can share strategic information related to information about supplier's current 
business strategy, information about supplier's competitive advantage, information about 
the future directions of supplier's business strategy, information about supplier's customer 
strategy, for instance. 
14. What are the effects if a supplier shares strategic information transparently? 
 
15. What are the requirements for sharing strategic information transparently? 
 
TRANSPARENCY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUPPLY NETWORK 
 
Lastly, in the supplier’s interviews: 
16. What kind of transparency types are the most important for further 
developments in this specific buyer-supplier relationship? 
 
Lastly, in the customer’s interviews: 
17. What kind of transparency types are the most important for further 
developments in different buyer-supplier relationships? 
